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Introduction
RECEIVING GADAMER
There are both good and bad reasons for American intellectual history’s relative neglect
of Hans-Georg Gadamer. On the one hand, Gadamer spent the vast majority of his scholarly
career in Germany, writing for European readers, teaching European students, and lecturing
before European audiences. His magnum opus, Truth and Method, did not appear in English
until 1975, and an authoritative translation was not published until 1989. Even then, most AngloAmerican philosophers reflexively consigned Gadamer’s work to what they called, sometimes
imprecisely and often derisively, the “continental” tradition of philosophy. When Gadamer did
give lectures or hold visiting professorships in the United States and Canada, which he did every
year between 1968 and 1986, he more often than not did so at the invitation of departments of
literature or humanities.
Yet this sparse treatment of Gadamer’s career in North America has obscured his
significant contributions to its intellectual life. Gadamer traveled to the United States for the first
time in 1968, the year before Richard Palmer, a professor of philosophy and religion at
MacMurray College in Illinois, published a monograph-length book introducing philosophical
hermeneutics to English-speaking audiences. For the following eighteen years, Gadamer traveled
either to the United States or Canada to serve as a visiting professor at various colleges and
universities, including Catholic University, Syracuse University, McMaster University,
Vanderbilt University and, for nearly a decade, Boston College. When he grew too old to make
the transatlantic journey, he continued to welcome American scholars and academics to his home
in Heidelberg every summer for what came to be informally called “the Gadamer festival,” a
week of discussion about hermeneutics. These festivalgoers returned to the U.S. armed with
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Gadamerian ideas and modes of thinking, which they incorporated into their own research
projects and taught in their own seminars. As Jean Grondin writes in his biography of Gadamer,
“The history of his ever-expanding circle of students has yet to be written.” 1
But Gadamer’s importance to the intellectual history of North America extends beyond
the small cadre of students that he mentored. The two decades that coincided with his visits
marked a period of dramatic change in American intellectual life, especially in the areas of study
that Gadamer called “the human sciences,” or what in the Anglo-American tradition are known
as “the humanities.” In literary criticism, New Criticism and other styles of formalism were
breathing their last breaths as proponents of literary theory, inspired by the work Jacques Derrida
and French post-structuralism, introduced radically new ways of thinking about texts and ideas.
In the social sciences, scholars were challenging the rosy positivism of the post-war period as
they tried to make sense of unprecedented social and political upheaval in the United States and
Western Europe. In Anglo-American philosophy, philosophers were pushing the so-called
linguistic turn to its limits, redefining not only the content of Anglo-American philosophy but
also the very purpose of philosophy itself. In the terminology of philosophical hermeneutics, the
horizons of North American intellectual life were shifting—rapidly and decisively.
Gadamer made significant philosophical contributions to nearly all of these
transformations. That said, his influence in North America should not be overstated. Gadamer
achieved neither the name recognition nor the scholarly importance that some of his European
peers––especially Derrida, and Foucault, but also Heidegger and Habermas––attained in the
English-speaking world. Even today, Gadamer remains, at best, a marginal figure in American
philosophical and literary circles.

1
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Yet the great irony of Gadamer’s influence is that so many of his ideas have become
philosophical commonplaces even as his name and work have faded from memory. Many of the
really live philosophical questions in American intellectual history––What does it mean to study
history as a discourse? How can historians make sense of these discourses across space, time,
culture, and language? What is the nature and structure of intellectual change? ––fall squarely
within the scope of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. What one of Gadamer’s students once said of
American philosophers is also true, in a broad sense, of American intellectual historians:
“Everyone has now become a hermeneut.”2 In this respect, Gadamer’s greatest contribution to
American intellectual history is not to be found in the monographs that have been written about
his work, but in the ability of his thinking to lend articulacy and clarity to ongoing debates in the
field. Tracing his influence is an exercise in recovering the origin and development of the
questions intellectual history still grapples with today.
With this in mind, this thesis attempts to accomplish three primary tasks. First, it offers
an account of the major philosophical concepts of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, especially those that
proved most relevant to his reception in North America. I have approached this task in Chapter
One through a close reading of the second section of Gadamer’s Truth and Method. Second,
Chapters Two and Three document and evaluate the reception of Gadamer’s work in the United
States and Canada. Because of the breadth of Gadamer’s influence and the scope of this project,
it would be impossible to offer a comprehensive account of Gadamer’s influence. Instead, I have
chosen to focus on four discrete events of reception––what I am calling “encounters” between
Gadamer and North American thinkers. I have chosen to call these events of reception
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Hans-Georg Gadamer, interview in Frankfurter Rundschau (February 11, 1995); see Grondin, Hans-Georg
Gadamer: A Biography, notes to pages 321-323, note 24, page 468.
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“encounters” for a number of reasons which I explore in the following chapters, but there is one
consideration that is worth stating here. In a literal sense, my narrative revolves around
exchanges that Gadamer conducted with four specific North American thinkers––Richard
Palmer, Paul de Mann, Charles Taylor, and Richard Rorty. In this story, I have used these figures
almost synecdochally, as representatives of broader currents and tendencies in North American
intellectual life. That said, it is necessary to recognize that no philosopher is an ideal
representative of any philosophical movement, and conversely, that no movement can be reduced
to the work of one of its representatives. Throughout, I have tried to balance the inescapable
necessity of generalizing about intellectual movements with a sensitivity to the idiosyncrasies
and specificities that characterize every philosopher’s work. At points, no doubt, I have failed.
This approach entails some other definite limitations which are worth acknowledging.
For one, my account prioritizes concentrated analysis of a handful philosophical questions over
broad, archeological investigation into Gadamer’s influence. For this reason, I have restricted my
focus to the two decades that Gadamer was present in North America. A more comprehensive
reception history would carry this narrative to the present, including the work of other of
Gadamer’s contemporaries, especially Robert Brandom and John McDowell, as well as of third
generation Gadamerians like James Risser, Georgia Warnke, Kristin Gjesdal, and Theodore
George. Secondly, in the interest of concision, my analysis sometimes collapses the divergent
responses to Gadamer’s work within a single movement. Geoffrey Hartman, for instance,
conceptualized philosophical hermeneutics very differently than did de Man, though both
nominally belonged to the same scholarly circle. 3 Finally, the complete story of Gadamer’s
reception in North America would engage some of his more strident American critics, including
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E.D. Hirsch and the followers of Leo Strauss, principally Stanley Rosen. 4 Each in their own way
have broadened the ever-expanding horizon of Gadamer’s hermeneutic project.
Nevertheless, I think that my general approach is justified by the third aim of this thesis,
which is to model a way of doing intellectual history that is critically informed by Gadamer’s
philosophical hermeneutics. Concretely, this attentiveness to the hermeneutical dimensions of
reception translates into two methodological choices. First, it has led me to present the history of
Gadamer’s reception dialogically, meaning that my narrative accounts for Gadamer’s reception
by tracing the logic of question and answer—what questions interpreters asked of Gadamer’s
text, as well as what questions it raised—that produced a given encounter. Secondly, it has
entailed focusing on the event of reception itself as an indispensable element of intellectual
history, rather than as an auxiliary or accidental historical phenomenon. Taking seriously
Gadamer’s claim that the meaning of a text always “goes beyond” the meaning that its author
held for it requires rethinking both the philosophical significance of reception for intellectual
history and the narrative techniques that we devise to tell these histories. I address some of these
questions in Chapters Two and Three, and I draw some tentative conclusion about a hermeneutic
historiology in my final section.
Finally, any attempt to make sense a theory of understanding inevitably raises some selfreflective questions, and I have tried to grapple with these questions rather than shy away from
them. As much as this project is an attempt to document the reception of Gadamer’s work in the
United States, it is also itself an event of reception, subject to the same hermeneutic dynamics
that I identify in Gadamer’s earlier encounters. It would be both a mistake and a missed
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opportunity to pass over these dynamics as they manifest in this project. As Gadamer argued,
understanding a text is always, in an important sense, an act of self-understanding. A genuine
encounter between a text and an interpreter puts the self-understanding of the interpreter at risk;
if successful, neither the interpreter nor the text emerges unchanged.
This is certainly true of Gadamer’s encounter with North America, and it is true, too, of
our encounter with Gadamer in 2020. If we always understand differently, how do we understand
Gadamer today? What does our encounter with Gadamer today reveal––about Gadamer’s texts
and about us? How has our horizon moved, and how has Gadamer moved with it?

6

Chapter One
(RE)READING TRUTH AND METHOD
Before exploring the reception of Gadamer’s work in America, I would like to establish
some of the essential points of his philosophical hermeneutics through a close reading of the
second section of Truth and Method. Gadamer’s tome is really three books in one, with each of
the book’s three sections—the first on aesthetics, the second on the human sciences, and the third
on language—able to stand on its own. It is the second section, however, in which Gadamer most
fully develops his concept of philosophical hermeneutics and which, despite the evolution of his
thought later in his life, remains the most systematic account of his philosophical project.
Yet as Gadamer’s reflection on the nature of effective history makes clear, even a
seemingly straightforward account of the internal economy of a text in fact constitutes an act of
interpretation. It is important to bear in mind, then, that the following reading does not aspire to
be a comprehensive explication of Gadamer’s argument. It is, rather, my reading of Gadamer’s
text, conditioned by my interests and my position in the tradition to which both Gadamer’s text
and I belong. As any sensitive reader of Gadamer will recognize, I have omitted portions of his
text that I deem nonessential to his argument, condensed sections that can be condensed, and
supplied my own analyses of Gadamer’s concepts where the text has “pulled me up short,” as
Gadamer would say. In particular, I have focused my analysis on elements of Gadamer’s
hermeneutics that figured prominently in his reception in North America. At critical junctures, I
have supplied citations to Gadamer’s text as signposts for the reader if they wish to turn to the
text itself.
It has been my hope to supply the following analysis in the spirit of Gadamer’s
historically effected consciousness, which does its best to listen to the text in its claim to truth
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while recognizing that complete analytic transparency remains a figment of the methodological
imagination. A reception history must be aware of what is at stake in reception.

1.1 THE PREHISTORY OF HERMENEUTICS
Because Gadamer aimed to develop a genuinely historical hermeneutics, he grounded his
own hermeneutics in the history of hermeneutic practice. In the opening chapter of the second
section of Truth and Method, Gadamer identified two dominant historical traditions of textual
interpretation: philological and theological hermeneutics. Philological hermeneutics, practiced by
secular scholars and humanists, began from the premise that the texts of classical antiquity
collectively formed the normative aesthetic and moral standard for all art and letters throughout
history. The purpose of philological hermeneutics was to discern this standard by reconciling the
diverse stylistic and philosophical tendencies of antiquity with one another. Theological
hermeneutics, on the other hand, attempted to discover the unity of scripture by reconciling the
text of the Old Testament with the text of the New and by squaring this synthetic interpretation
with the ever-growing corpus of Church dogma.
Following the Reformation’s decisive break with Catholic dogma, hermeneutics
acquired a new urgency. Having rejected the Church’s allegorical readings of scripture, the
reformers declared scripture sui ipsius interpres: subject to no interpretive principle other than
itself. To guide this new style of interpretive practice, the reformers appropriated a principle
technique of philological hermeneutics: the hermeneutic circle. For the classical philologists, the
hermeneutic circle was an interpretive method. It instructed readers to make sense of a text in a
circular manner, by passing from an understanding of its individual parts to an understanding of
the text as a whole, then to reinterpret the parts of the text in light of its whole meaning, and so
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on in a continual cycle of interpretation and reinterpretation. By utilizing this principle, the
reformers argued, theologians and laymen alike could make sense of the entirety of scripture
without deferring to the Church’s dogmatic teachings.
Gadamer identified the reformer’s synthesis of theological and philological interpretation
as the starting point of “prehistory” of his own hermeneutics.1 Yet this prehistory was important
to Gadamer only insofar as it established what his own hermeneutics is not—namely, a system of
rules or techniques to guide the proper interpretation of a text. For Gadamer, the decisive
peripatetia in the history of hermeneutics came at the beginning of the nineteenth century, with
the work of the German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher. Unlike his predecessors,
Schleiermacher fully drew out the implications of the Reformation’s emphasis on the sui ipsius
interpres nature of scripture. Although Schleiermacher still understood hermeneutics as the
method for establishing the unity and coherence of scripture, he recognized that the reformer’s
rejection of Church dogma had thrown the basic structure of understanding itself into doubt.
“The art of understanding came under fundamental theoretical examination and universal
cultivation because neither scripturally nor rationally founded agreement could any longer
constitute the dogmatic guidelines of textual interpretation,” wrote Gadamer. “Thus it was
necessary for Schleiermacher to provide a fundamental motivation for hermeneutical reflection
and so place the problem of hermeneutics within a hitherto unknown horizon.”2 Before tackling
the narrower question of textual and scriptural interpretation, Schleiermacher argued,
hermeneutics had to investigate the nature of understanding more generally.
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Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (Second, Revised Edition), trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G.
Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2004), 174.
2
Gadamer, Truth and Method, 179.
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Schleiermacher directed this inquiry in a particular direction. Deeply influenced by the
Romantic concept of the creative genius, he conceptualized understanding as an act of artistic,
divinatory subjectivity. To understand a text meant to transport oneself into the mind of its
author through a creative, even clairvoyant act of imagination. This transposition was possible,
Schleiermacher argued, because every individual participated in a universal Weltgeist, or worldSpirit, that served as a spiritual conduit for sympathetic identification. “Schleiermacher’s
particular contribution [to the history of hermeneutics] is psychological interpretation,” Gadamer
wrote. “[Interpretation] is ultimately a divinatory process, a placing of oneself within the whole
framework of the author, an apprehension of the ‘inner origin’ of the composition of a work, a
recreation of the creative act.”3 Understanding, like artistic creation itself, ultimately depended
on an act of subjectivity––one mind coming to know another.
Although Gadamer identified Schleiermacher’s work as the origin of a fundamental reevaluation of hermeneutics, he rejected almost all of Schleiermacher’s conclusions. He was
particularly critical of Schleiermacher’s contention that understanding required some mystical
“communion of souls” that took place ahead of the work of actual interpretation. If an interpreter
was able to arrive at some sort of shared understanding with an author, Gadamer argued, it was
only because he had done the difficult work of interpreting the text.4 By situating sympathetic
understanding before interpretation, Schleiermacher had mixed up the sequence of
understanding: sympathetic identification follows from interpretation, not the other way around.
Moreover, Gadamer argued that this mistake betrayed Schleiermacher’s incomplete commitment
to the logic of the hermeneutic circle as a principle of understanding. Schleiermacher had
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adopted this principle from his Protestant predecessors, but he had reinterpreted it as a
psychological principle: an interpreter must understand a text as a part of an author’s subjectivity
and author’s subjectivity as the totality of his art. Yet Schleiermacher’s divinatory act of
understanding defied the logic of the circle, according to which interpretation never fully
resolves into static understanding. As an interpreter moves from part to whole and back to part,
his understanding is always subject to reinterpretation. Yet Schleiermacher’s divinatory act,
which allowed the interpreter to gain unmediated access to the subjectivity of the author,
promised an escape from the circle, the possibility of attaining a fixed and unmediated
understanding of a text.
Gadamer also took aim at one of Schleiermacher’s central hermeneutic creeds: that
interpretation allowed an interpreter to understand a text better than the author understood it.
Although this principle was as old as hermeneutics itself—indeed, Gadamer wrote that “in its
changing interpretation the whole history of modern hermeneutics can be read”—Schleiermacher
endowed it with a particular power. If all artistic creation issued forth from an act of individual
genius, then various elements of those creations that remained opaque to the creator could
become apparent to an interpreter who approached the text from a linguistic or historical
distance.5 This is obvious, for example, in the case of a non-native speaker who interprets a text
in a foreign langue: for the non-native speaker, the grammar and syntax of the text become
objects of conscious analysis in a way that they never were for the writer. According to
Schleiermacher, insofar as the interpreter came to a more thorough understanding of the text qua
text, it could be said that he had understood the text better than did the writer himself.

5
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But, as Gadamer pointed out, texts do not exist solely as linguistic artifacts. They are also
media of communication, and as such, they also claim to say something true about their subject
matter. In this respect, Schleiermacher’s psychologized hermeneutics did not guarantee that an
interpreter would understand the subject matter of a text better than its author. In fact, by
construing texts as the products of a creative genius, Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic practically
guaranteed that the interpreter would fall short of understanding the substance of the text as well
as its form. In this respect, Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics manifested the tell-tale characteristic
of what Gadamer identified as “method”: it offered a universal procedure of understanding that
was not sensitive to the nature of the object that is claimed to explain.
If Schleiermacher began the expansion of hermeneutics from a narrowly methodological
practice of textual interpretation into a comprehensive theory of human understanding, Wilhelm
Dilthey developed that project into a full-fledged philosophical system. Dilthey, who was born in
1883, the year before Schleiermacher died, became the heir and most clairvoyant interpreter of
the so-called historical school, exemplified by the work of Leopold von Ranke and Johann
Gustav Droysen.6 Emerging from Giambattista Vico’s and Johann Gottfried Herder’s critique of
Enlightenment ahistoricism, the historical school urged a complete rejection of historical
teleology, either of the Hegelian variety, which understood history as the gradual manifestation
of Mind in the world, or of the Enlightenment variety, which construed all of history as the
gradual triumph of reason over superstition and irrationalism. So, too, did the historical school
take aim at the reverse teleology of Weimar classicism, which located the zenith of human
perfection in antiquity and charted all of history as the gradual decline and reemergence of
classical perfection. The thinkers of the historical school argued that these superficially diverse

6

Gadamer, Truth and Method, 198.

12

set of historiographic approaches shared a common conception of historical understanding: they
all judged the past by an a priori and ahistorical standard—the manifestation of Mind, or the
triumph of Reason, or the aesthetic standards of classical antiquity. Against this aprioristic
approach, the historical school proposed a program of careful documentary and linguistic
research that would allow historians to understand the past on its own terms: “To think
historically now means to acknowledge that each period has its own right to exist, its own
perfection,” Gadamer wrote of the historicist inclination.7
Yet the historical school’s rejection of a priori historical standards raised a new
interpretive problem: if historical events could not be evaluated by way of reference to some
ahistorical principle, how could historians make sense of them? The historical school’s solution
was the same one that the Reformers had offered about scriptural interpretation and that
Schleiermacher offered about textual interpretation: that historical events must be understood as
parts of a complete historical whole, and that the historical whole must be understood as the
unity of its parts. By applying the classical principle of the hermeneutic circle to the past itself,
the anti-teleological polemic of the historical school suggests that all of history could be treated
like text. “It is not just that sources are texts, but historical reality itself is a text that has to be
understood,” Gadamer wrote.8 Like literary and religious texts, history, too, became sui ipsus
interpres. No metaphysical principle or dogmatic interest could displace the inner logic of
history itself.
But the historicists’ textualization of history brought with it the same litany of problems
and contradictions that had plagued Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics. To that, it added the obvious
contradictions that arose from treating the past itself as a text. First, it is not apparent that history

7
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forms a compressive whole in the way that a text does. The historical record is fragmentary,
incomplete and, as Gadamer wrote, always “breaks off in the dark.”9 If the past is a text, it is a
heavily redacted one with an indefinite beginning and an uncertain number of missing pages.
Secondly, because the past is a whole only insofar as it includes an ever-accumulating series of
presents, the historian does not stand outside the history he studies in the same way that a critic
stands outside a text. Gadamer was quick to point out that the unity that allegedly undergirded
the intelligibility of all history was not so much an empirical fact as a dogmatic presupposition.
Who, after all, had stepped outside history so as to observe it as a whole?
Gadamer also accused the historical school of smuggling an implicit teleology into its
avowedly anti-teleological hermeneutics. If discrete historical events could only be understood
from the vantage point of universal history, then a historian could only determine the
significance of a historical fact—indeed, whether that thing ought to be considered historical fact
in the first place—from the vantage point of future events. “Whether or not something is
successful not only determines the meaning of a single event and accounts for the fact that it
produces a lasting effect or passes unnoticed,” Gadamer wrote. “Success or failure causes the
whole series of actions and events to be meaningful or meaningless.” 10 Luther posting his ninetyfive theses on the door of the church in Wittenberg, for example, became the start of the
Reformation only in light of events that followed Luther’s action; Caesar’s crossing of the
Rubicon was a success and not a failure only because he prevailed in the ensuing civil war.
Although the standard by which historical events are to be judged cannot be deduced a priori, it
remained teleological, insofar as past events seemed to aim at future events with which they were

9
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not intrinsically connected. “The ontological structure of history itself, then, is teleological,
although without a telos,” Gadamer wrote11
All this formed the background to Dilthey’s project. Writing a generation after Droysen
and Ranke, Dilthey recognized the shortcomings of the historical school and attempted to
construct an epistemology of the Geisteswissenschaften that would overcome them. First and
foremost, he understood that the historical school’s rejection of the central tenets of Hegelian
idealism raised a fundamental epistemological issue. According to Hegel, subjects could have
knowledge of the world because the world was itself the manifestation of Mind; the metaphysical
homogeneity of subject and object rendered knowledge of the world unproblematic. Rejecting
this homogeneity, as Hegel’s critics had done, rendered the mechanism by which mind comes to
know the world uncertain.
Kant’s transcendental idealism offered one strategy for solving this problem, and it was a
solution that would prove particularly attractive to Dilthey. Born thirty years after Kant’s death,
Dilthey presented himself as the Kant of the human sciences, doing for the human sciences what
Kant had done for the natural science by delineating the categories of understanding that would
place knowledge of the historical world on firm epistemological footing. But Dilthey did not
follow the neo-Kantians in trying uncritically to adapt Kant’s philosophy to the human situation.
Instead, he argued that the type of knowledge at work in the human sciences was essentially
different from the type of knowledge at work in the Naturwissenschaften, or natural sciences.
Whereas the natural sciences made judgments about the external world (Kant’s a priori synthetic
judgments), the human sciences took as their subject the historical world, which for Dilthey was
a world that was always and everywhere a product of the human mind. (Dilthey would
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presumably be miffed by the idea of natural history.) In place of Hegel’s absolute Mind, Dilthey
adopted Vico’s doctrine of verus est ipsum factum: that humans have privileged knowledge of
the things that they themselves have made—civil society, art, history.
Dilthey’s hermeneutics followed from this supposition. Because historical life and
human life flowed from the same source, the structure of history mirrored the structure of an
individual’s own life—and for Dilthey, the experience of life was fundamentally the experience
of continuity. Except in moments of acute psychological distress, Dilthey argued, humans do not
experience their lives as discreet and fragmented experiences which they must then synthesize
into a contiguous and unified whole. Rather, life always already comes in complete units of
significance. “For [Dilthey] significance is not a logical concept, but is to be understood as an
expression of life,” Gadamer wrote. “Life itself, flowing temporality, is ordered towards the
formation of enduring units of significance. Life interprets itself. Life itself has a hermeneutical
structure.”12 It was in this sense that Gadamer calls Dilthey’s philosophy a “life philosophy”: a
philosophy based not on conceptual principles or dispassionate logical analyses but on the
experience of life as humans live it. Philosophy was life thinking itself, as Gadamer liked to say.
But Dilthey’s decision to model historical experience on the psychological experience of
the individual raised problems, Gadamer argued, since the unity and coherence of history never
becomes an object of experience for an individual in the same way that the unity of his life does.
The finitude of any individual’s life means that he only ever experiences a part of history. To
resolve this contradiction, Dilthey had again appealed to Vico’s principle of the primacy of
maker’s knowledge. According to Dilthey, the historical world that we find ourselves immersed
in is not an alien world. It is, rather, a world formed by “objectification life itself,” the same life

12

Gadamer, Truth and Method, 226.

16

that the subject is immersed in. As a result, Dilthey argued, the individual could experience the
continuity of all of history because history was of a kind with life. In this respect, Gadamer
rightly accused Dilthey of simply reverting to an amended form of Hegelianism, in which
historical consciousness replaced absolute Spirit as the concept of an objective Mind. Whereas
Hegel identified the self-encounter of the human mind with itself in the practice of metaphysics,
Dilthey identified it in the study of culture—history, literature, and art. Yet the structure of this
encounter remained fundamentally the same: Mind knows the world because Mind and world are
one.
Gadamer’s criticism of this substitution foreshadows his more comprehensive critique of
Dilthey’s hermeneutics, namely that behind his exultation of historical consciousness, Dilthey
attempted to arrive at a thoroughly ahistorical understanding of history— “the complete
dissolution of all alienness, of all difference,” as Gadamer called it.13 In this sense, Gadamer
argued, Dilthey’s historical consciousness shared something not only with Hegel’s idealism but
also with Enlightenment rationalism and empiricism. In the same way that the rationalist
believed that systematic doubt and rational reconstruction could deliver a subject to timeless, a
priori knowledge of the world, or the empiricist believed that experimentation allowed an
observer to transcend the accidental limitations of his own experience to gain objective
knowledge of his subject, Dilthey believed that historical consciousness allowed a subject to
transcend the limits of his finitude to gain a timeless understanding of the past.14
Yet this desire for an ahistorical grasp of history brought Dilthey’s historical thinking
into conflict with his life philosophy. In the latter respect, Dilthey’s great achievement was his
discovery that consciousness was itself a historical phenomenon, that it belonged to and was the
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product of the very historical reality that it endeavored to understand. At the same time, Dilthey
tried to establish a methodology that would allow a historian to transcend his historical
condition. These two warring tendencies gave rise to what Gadamer called the “aporias of
historicism.” If consciousness is a historical phenomenon, Gadamer argued, then our
understanding of the past is crucially determined by our belonging to history. Any attempt to step
outside that history to gain some timeless vantage-point would destroy the basis upon which we
come to understand the past in the first place.
Dilthey had tried to overcome this contradiction by adopting a reflexive stance towards
historical consciousness itself: once historical consciousness comes to understand itself
historically—as conditioned by and part of an historical past—it can transcend its own historicity
and continue with its task of deciphering the book of history. But Gadamer denied that such a
reflexive posture could resolve the contradiction. Instead of drawing the logic of historical
consciousness to its conclusion, Dilthey, under the spell of his “unresolved Cartesianism,” had
simply ignored the essential historicity of historical consciousness.15 Like Descartes, he had
failed to see that there existed a type of certainty inherent in life itself—an “immediate living
certainty that all ends and values have when they appear in human consciousness with an
absolute claim”—beyond the certainty of Cartesian rationalism.16 Unlike scientific or rational
certainty, the certainty that was native to life was not the product of methodological doubt, but
way always already anterior to it.
Because of this aporia, Gadamer concluded that the hermeneutical project begun by
Schleiermacher and continued by Dilthey had reached a philosophical dead end. Hermeneutics
could not hope to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of texts merely by understanding the
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mind of an author or by reconstructing the historical conditions in which a text came to be.
“Reconstructing the original circumstances, like all restoration, is a futile undertaking in view of
the historicity of our being,” Gadamer wrote. “What is reconstructed, a life brought back from
the lost past, is not the original.”17 In place of “reconstruction,” Gadamer proposed a new starting
point for hermeneutics—what he called, following Hegel, the path of “integration.”
Despite his ultimately ahistorical conclusions, Hegel had lucidly thought through the
structure of historical consciousness—a consciousness that was always and everywhere part of
history itself. In trying to discover the past, Hegel argued, historical consciousness was like a girl
attempting to revive a piece of fruit that had been plucked from its tree. In its effort to allow the
fruit of the historical past to live, historical consciousness supplies all the instruments of analysis
that it has access to—linguistic, material, philological—but it cannot, like the girl, ultimately
return that fruit to its tree. Although these efforts of historical reconstruction might teach us
something about a historical phenomenon—Hegel compared it to wiping spots of rain or dust
from the fruit—they did not, Hegel argued, represent our authentic relationship to the past. When
we encounter the past, we always encounter it as something changed; it comes to us as
something old, but also as something new. Our experience of the past is always tinged by this
tension. Despite its obvious foreignness, the past still makes a claim on us—a claim to reveal
something true about the world.
Gadamer took this insight as the starting point for his own philosophical hermeneutics.
Unlike Romantic or historicist hermeneutics, Hegel presented the historicity of understanding as
a fundamental fact of historical understanding, not as something to be overcome. As a result, the
past, for Hegel, was not some foreign and inaccessible domain. It was, rather, a source of real
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truth and insight. “Hegel states a definite truth, inasmuch as the essential nature of the historical
spirit consists not in the restoration of the past but in thoughtful mediation with contemporary
life,” Gadamer wrote.18 By contrast, Dilthey’s historical consciousness was an aestheticizing
consciousness: it reduced all of human culture to its expressive content, obscuring its claim to be
a truthful and meaningful account of being. In so doing, historicism had reduced hermeneutics to
a method which, while not completely inert, failed to account for the totality of our hermeneutic
situation. For Gadamer, a comprehensive account of understanding had to take account of
historical experience in its entirety––both the experience of foreignness and the experience of
familiarity. In other words, hermeneutics had to take account not only of method—the attempt to
make the past speak on its own terms—but also of truth—the past’s stubborn and haunting
ability to speak to us as contemporaries.

1.2 NEW HORIZONS: HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER
In Germany during the first half of the twentieth century, to follow Hegel’s path of
integration meant to follow Husserl and Heidegger. For both Heidegger and Gadamer, Husserl’s
phenomenology provided the philosophical starting point for solving the fundamental problem
facing post-Kantian philosophy, namely the apparent chasm between mind and the world in its
various manifestations—scientific, historical, religious. How did mind, something within us,
interact with the world, something out there?
Rather than offer a new solution to this old problem, Husserl had reframed the question
altogether. For Husserl, the essential quality of consciousness was its intentionality, i.e., that
consciousness is always consciousness of something. To speak of mind independently of world
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or of world independently of mind was pure abstraction, Husserl argued, since our experience is
always of mind and the world as a unity––as Husserl put it, consciousness always assumes the
form of a “coordination” between mind and world. The purpose of Husserl’s phenomenology,
therefore, was to explore the nature of this coordination—to “bracket[] all positing of being and
investigate the subjective modes of giveness,” as Gadamer described it.19 From the
phenomenological perspective, a comprehensive understanding of the world could only be
arrived at through a comprehensive analysis of subjectivity.
Husserl’s phenomenological turn opened up radical new philosophical possibilities. First,
phenomenology made possible a fundamentally new way of characterizing experience. Husserl
denied that discrete, intentional experiences of the sort championed by empiricist or rationalist
epistemologies could ever serve as the basic experiential unit. We do, in fact, have discrete and
intentional experiences of things—as when we consciously focus our attention on some object,
be it a fork or a moment in life—but Husserl argued that this mode of experience is a derivative
one, made possible by a more fundamental mode of engagement with the world, what Husserl
calls “time-consciousness.” Husserl developed his analysis of time-consciousness by way of
analogy with spatial consciousness: just as we never perceive individual objects in space in
vacuo—they always appear against some visual horizon—so, too, do discrete experiences exists
against a temporal horizon. In the case of vision, it is the very presence this horizon that allows
us to differentiate individual objects from each other; if the horizon disappeared, visual
differentiation would become nigh impossible. The same was true, Husserl argued, of timeconsciousness. Although we can direct our attention to discrete and immediate experiences, those
experiences never stand alone; they only emerge against the unity of experience that unfolds in
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and across time. “Every such intentional experience always implies a twofold empty horizon of
what is not actually meant in it, but towards which an actual meaning can, of its nature, be
directed,” Gadamer wrote.20 These comprehensive horizons of meaning, not discrete
experiences, represent the fundamental phenomenological unit.
But Husserl’s re-description of experience didn’t end there. For Husserl, these more
comprehensive horizons of experience existed within another, even more comprehensive
horizon, what Husserl called the “life-world”: “the world in which we are immersed in the
natural attitude that never becomes an object as such for us, but that represents the pregiven basis
of all experience,” as Gadamer defines it.21 Importantly, the life-world as it emerged in
phenomenological research was fundamentally different than the world that constituted the
object of natural scientific research. Unlike the natural world, the life-world did not exist
ontically: it was constituted entirely by subjectivity, meaning that it was also constituted
historically. Moreover, a given life-world could not be situated in another, more comprehensive
horizon. As the pregiven condition of all experience, it represented the phenomenological
backstop. Life-worlds were therefore both historical and plural; they could not be reconciled in
some “historical universe” that would encompass all life-worlds. As Gadamer recognized,
Husserl had confronted the “specter of relativism” without shying away from it.22
Although Gadamer positioned Husserl’s work as a significant step forward for the type
of life philosophy that Dilthey originated, he argued that one of Dilthey’s collaborators, Count
Paul Yorck von Wartenburg, in fact had given the project its fullest expression. Yorck’s
philosophy began with life in a comprehensive sense: both biological life, the life of humans as
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living organism, and the life of consciousness, the life of humans as conscious beings. Influenced
by Darwin’s evolutionary theory, Yorck contended that these two modes of life were in fact
structurally correlated. As in biological life, in which the constant assertion of the individual
organism against every other organism results in a homeostatic and shared life form, so, too, in
the life of consciousness does the constant assertion of self-consciousness against the alienness
of objects and other consciousnesses result in a shared comportment between self and world.
Although biological and conscious life begin with a primordial division (Urteilung) between self
and other, both result in a unity in which self assimilates to itself what is other.
The fundamental act of consciousness, then, was assimilation. “What is alive preserves
itself by drawing into itself everything that is outside it,” Gadamer wrote of York’s philosophy.
“Everything that is alive nourishes itself on what is alien to it. The fundamental fact of being
alive is assimilation.”23 Gadamer took this conclusion literally: every living organism sustains
itself on something that is not itself—for example, food, water, and oxygen—which, by means of
ingestion, becomes part of itself. Likewise, assimilation was the essential activity of selfconsciousness. While constantly differentiating from the self everything that, as a potential
object of knowledge, is not self—historical objects, literature, other people—self-consciousness
simultaneously assimilates those things to its being; they become a part of self-consciousness
itself. This process of assimilation and differentiation formed the basis of what Husserl would
later call “comportment.”
In this respect, both Husserl and York provided support for Hegel’s project of integration:
the task of hermeneutics was not to guide historical reconstruction but to explain the integration
of past and present that everywhere characterizes historical experience. Gadamer argued that any
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effort by the human sciences to objectify the products of conscious life, or to elevate the subject
to some supra-historical status, would destroy the possibility of understanding altogether. “What
is alive is not such that a person could ever grasp it from the outside, in its living quality,”
Gadamer wrote. “The only way to grasp life is, rather, to become inwardly aware of it…life is
experienced only in the awareness of oneself, the inner consciousness of one’s own living.” 24
Moreover, a true life philosophy of the sort developed by Husserl and Yorck could no longer
abide by the naïve distinction between objectivism and subjectivism. Even to thus frame the
debate conceded too much to the epistemological framework: it approached the subject on
objectivist terms, as an entity that stands apart from, and in no necessary relationship with, the
objects of intentionality.
Phenomenology after Husserl therefore provided philosophy with an entirely new task.
Unlike rationalist epistemology, which offered a proscriptive method for arriving at universally
valid representations of the world, phenomenological research attempted to describe the
productivity of life, which always already had the form of a comportment between the subject
and the world. “Only insofar as philosophical reflection corresponds to the structure of being
alive does it acquire its own legitimacy,” Gadamer wrote. “Its task is to understand the
achievements of consciousness in terms of their origin, understanding them as results—i.e., as
the projection of the original being-alive and its original division.”25 Life philosophy would serve
to describe not what consciousness can do or what it ought to do, but what “happens to us over
and above our wanting and doing,” as Gadamer wrote in the preface to Truth and Method.26
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Yet Gadamer believed that it was Heidegger, not Husserl, who had most fully realized
this philosophical project. Although Heidegger appropriated much of Husserl’s phenomenology,
he provided it with a much more radical starting point. To Heidegger, Husserl’s phenomenology
retained too much too much of Cartesianism, insofar as it sought to establish the nature of being
as a whole on the basis of consciousness. Heidegger, by contrast, took the question of being in an
entirely new direction. Contra the epistemological tradition, which began the question of being
with a turn to the subject’s self-presence, Heidegger began his inquiry into being with a turn
outward. For Heidegger, Gadamer wrote, “[t]here is a quite different reason why the
understanding of being is possible at all, namely that there is a ‘there,’ a clearing in being—i.e., a
distinction between being and beings. Inquiry into the fundamental fact that this ‘exists’ is, in
fact, inquiry into being.”27
For Heidegger, an account of the being of human beings, what he called “Dasein,” had to
involve the reality of this “there.” To capture the fact that the encounter between human beings
and the world was not merely incidental to Dasein but is fact constituted its very nature,
Heidegger referred to Dasein as “being-in-the-world”: to be human meant to be in and among the
world. Heidegger recognized that we are not merely “in” the world in the same way that we can
be “in” a room or a building. (Heidegger called this type of being-in “being-at-hand.) We are in
the world in the sense that without the world, there would be no such thing as Dasein. In this
sense, Heidegger’s concept of Dasein was itself a radicalization of Husserl’s concept of
comportment. For Heidegger, the comportment of human beings and the world was not merely a
discovery of phenomenological research. It was the fundamental fact of ontology.
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Like Husserl’s phenomenology, Heidegger’s movement towards this existential ontology
opened up a dramatic new way of characterizing experience. Because being fundamentally
belonged in the world, Heidegger characterized Dasein’s native condition in the world not as a
relationship of objectivization––mind coming to know the world but objectifying it––but of what
Heidegger called “understanding.” Both he and Gadamer used this term “understanding” in a
particular sense. In Heideggerian terms, understanding is not an achievement of consciousness so
much as it was an existential condition. “Understanding is not a resigned ideal of human
experience adopted in the old age of the spirit, as with Dilthey; nor is it, as with Husserl, a last
methodological ideal of philosophy in contrast to the naïveté of unreflecting life,” Gadamer
wrote. “It is, on the contrary, the original form of realization of Dasein, which is being-in-theworld.”28
Heidegger identified a number of key characteristics of this understanding. For one,
understanding is projective, meaning it is concerned with Dasein’s ability to act in the future. It
captures our pre-articulate orientation in the world, not unlike the way our orientation in familiar
locations allows us to successfully navigate those spaces without conscious thought. As a result,
understanding is also fundamentally practical. Gadamer noted that despite their apparent
differences, understanding in the natural sciences (understanding the structure of a molecule, for
example), understanding in a practical sense (understanding how to ride a bicycle or draw a
picture), and understanding a text (being able to interpret it) all share the basic characteristic of
“knowing one’s way around” a thing, of being able to successfully use a thing to achieve
something else. Finally, insofar as all understanding involves knowing one’s way around
something, it also contains an element of self-knowledge: it entails the ability to project future
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possibilities of one’s own engagement with the world. As Gadamer concluded, “all such
understanding is ultimately self-understanding.”29
And for Heidegger, this self-understanding was characterized by an inescapable
experience of one’s own limitedness and finitude. Although Dasein projects itself towards future
possibilities of being, it quickly learns that those possibilities are not infinite, since Dasein
always already finds itself in a world that it did not itself create. This characteristic of Dasein is
what Heidegger calls “thrownness,” and its correlative ontological condition—that the world
already precedes our being in it—he called “facticity.” Facticity is evident not only in things-athand that present us with an inescapable claim to antiquity—ruins, rock formations, texts—but
also in less tangible and more totalizing ways—by traditions, social orders, even language itself.
From the standpoint of the epistemological tradition, facticity acted as a barrier to the complete
realization of self-conscious being that rises above its temporality to gain a timeless perspective
on the world. But for Heidegger and for Gadamer, facticity was neither good nor bad—it simply
was. To describe the condition of Dasein limited being-in-the-world, Heidegger developed what
he called the “hermeneutics of facticity.”
Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity served as the final launching pad for Gadamer’s
own philosophical hermeneutics. “The main point of the hermeneutics of facticity…was that no
freely chosen relation toward one’s own being can get behind the facticity of this being,”
Gadamer wrote. “Everything that makes possible and limits Dasein’s projection ineluctably
precedes it.”30 For Heidegger, the hermeneutics of facticity had served as a stepping-stone to an
entirely new account of being, but Gadamer recognized that Heidegger’s analysis had also
transformed the set of questions that the human sciences needed to ask about themselves. In fact,
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Gadamer recognized that the human sciences were in fact the perfect field in which to
demonstrate the force of Heidegger’s ontology. “That the structure of Dasein is thrown
projection, that in realizing its own being Dasein is understanding, must also be true of the act of
understanding in the human sciences,” Gadamer wrote. “The general structure of understanding
is concretized in historical understanding, in that the concrete bonds of custom and tradition and
the corresponding possibilities of one’s own future become effective in understanding itself.”
In this respect, Heidegger’s analysis opened up radical new possibilities for
hermeneutics. If understanding was the basic mode of being-in-the-world and not the product of
methodological reflection or transhistorical sympathetic identification, then the task of a
hermeneutics was not to offer new techniques of interpretation but to describe the movement and
productivity of understanding as it always occurs. Following Heidegger, Gadamer made
hermeneutics a subspecies of life philosophy: its purpose was to explicate understanding in terms
of life. And that meant explicating understanding in terms of Dasein’s finite being. “That we
study history only insofar as we are ourselves ‘historical’ means that the historicity of human
Dasein in its expectancy and its forgetting is the condition of our being able to re-present the
past,” Gadamer wrote.31 The promise of this new hermeneutics was to explain historical
understanding as itself a historical phenomenon.
Thus for Gadamer, the history of hermeneutics did not culminate in a more clairvoyant
method of textual interpretation but in a new philosophical orientation towards understanding
itself. Just what this orientation entailed was the subject of Gadamer’s own hermeneutic analysis.
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1.3 ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS
The Hermeneutic Circle
The basis of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics was his re-description of the
condition understanding in light of Heidegger’s analysis. To begin this description, Gadamer
reinterpreted the classical interpretive principle of the hermeneutic circle as a descriptive
ontological account of understanding—in other words, as a description of what happens when an
interpreter confronts a text.
A complete account of understanding, Gadamer argued, had to begin before the
interpretive act itself, with the “fore-conceptions” and “fore-meanings” that an interpreter brings
to a text. The most fundamental of these fore-conceptions is the fore-conception of
completeness: an interpreter always approaches a text with the expectation that it has something
to say and that it will say it in a way that is intelligible. Without this fore-conception, Gadamer
argued, an interpreter would lack any motivation for approaching the text in the first place. Aside
from a fore-conception of completeness, an interpreter brings to a text any number of other
expectations––that it is a timeless classic, or an uplifting romance, or a factual chronicle of a past
era. Gadamer called these expectations “fore meanings.”
The circle unfolds with the process of reading. Diving into a text, an interpreter at first
gleans a limited meaning from only a portion of the text, which he projects forward as meaning
onto the whole of the text in a process which Gadamer called “fore-projection.” As the
interpreter reads on, these fore-projections in turn become fore-conceptions that he brings to the
remainder of the text. As he encounters new portions of the text, he revises his old foreconceptions in light of the new meanings and devises new, more comprehensive fore-projections.
Once he had encountered the text as a whole, he uses his grasp of the whole to reinterpret

29

specific parts, which in turn revise his understanding of the whole, and so on. “Interpretation
begins with fore-conceptions that are replaced by more suitable ones,” Gadamer wrote. “This
constant process of new projection constitutes the movement of understanding and
interpretation.”32
But what happens when understanding breaks down, when we misunderstand or fail to
understand at all? Gadamer argued that misunderstanding occurs when the text fails to
substantiate the interpreter’s fore-conceptions or fore-meanings, either in the realm of linguistic
usage or of content. In the realm of linguistic usage, an interpreter might become aware that a
text employs a term in a sense that is unfamiliar to him, and, as a consequence, he fails to make
sense of a clause or sentence because he cannot grasp its terminology. In the realm of content, a
text might employ a concept that is completely foreign to the reader. In either case, the meaning
of a text frustrates the reader’s fore-conception—Gadamer called this experience “being pulled
up short by the text.”33
It is at this point that a sensitive hermeneutic reader, having become aware of his foreconceptions as fore-conceptions, faces a choice: either to proceed with his existing foreconception or to revise them in light of the new meaning presented by the text. In the first case,
he risks failing to understand the meaning of the text as a whole, since his unaltered foreconceptions will continue to obscure individual parts of the text’s meaning. Alternatively, he
may revise his fore-conception to accommodate the expansive meaning of the text. But this act
of revision requires the reader to recognize the distance between his own fore-meaning and the
meaning of the text itself. Gadamer wrote, “[A] person trying to understand a text is prepared for
it to tell him something. That is why a hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, from the
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start sensitive to the text’s alterity. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither ‘neutrality’ with
respect to content nor the extinction of one’s self, but the foregrounding and appropriation of
one’s own fore-meanings and prejudices.”34 Foreshadowing one of Gadamer’s other major
concepts, it unfolds in the form of a dialogue. In this respect, Gadamer’s conception of
interpretation, like Heidegger’s account of understanding more generally, is fundamentally
practical. It entails self-knowledge and the possibility of projection as much as it entails static
knowledge of the other.
But what of the circle itself? At first blush, Gadamer appears to have denigrated the
process of understanding to the status of a vicious circle, since he includes pre-judgements (i.e.,
prejudices) as a necessary component of understanding. Is prejudice not, however, a barrier to
understanding, something to be overcome in the process of grasping a text’s meaning? For
Gadamer, coming to see how prejudice is, in fact, productive of understanding required coming
to terms with an a more complex prejudice: the prejudice against prejudice itself.

The Rehabilitation of Prejudice
Prejudice is an essential concept for Gadamer’s hermeneutic analysis, but he employed
the term in a narrowly etymological sense: prejudices are judgments that we arrive at before we
have encountered all the relevant material. In this sense, every stage of the interpretive process—
fore-meanings, fore-projections, fore-conceptions—involves prejudice, since they all precede a
comprehensive understanding of the text. Insofar as Gadamer used the term to describe a
necessary component of understanding, he used it as normatively neutral term: it simply
describes what we do when we understand. Yet Gadamer was cognizant that, in the
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Enlightenment’s epistemology, “prejudice” was a dirty word. In fact, Gadamer argued, a
defining characteristic of Enlightenment epistemology was its “prejudice against prejudice
itself.”35
In Gadamer’s reckoning, the Enlightenment’s prejudice against prejudice was a
consequence of its conception of knowledge as something arrived at through methodological
investigation. If knowledge only attains the status of certainty when it has been subjected to
reason (i.e. radical doubt or empirical investigation), then any knowledge which has yet to be
subject to that method is, by definition, prejudicial. “The only thing that gives a judgment dignity
is having a basis, a methodological justification (and not the fact that it may actually be correct),”
Gadamer wrote. “For the Enlightenment, the absence of such a basis does not mean that there
might be other kinds of certainty, but rather that the judgment has no foundation in the things
themselves—i.e., that it is ‘unfounded.’”36 In Gadamer’s parlance, the Enlightenment collapsed
truth and method. Without method, truth disappeared.
This union between truth and method, Gadamer argued, held deep implications for postEnlightenment historiography. Insofar as the dominant historiographical traditions of the
nineteenth century—especially historicism—had adopted the Enlightenment’s methodological
epistemology, they, too, manifested its prejudice against prejudice. Although historicism
emerged in large part as a subset of the Romantic reaction against Enlightenment rationalism,
Gadamer argued that it had nevertheless adopted its primary historiographical scheme, defined
by reason’s progressive conquest of tradition and myth. Whereas the Enlightenment championed
this steady march towards the hegemony of reason, Romanticism had reversed the
Enlightenment’s valuation, advocating instead for the preservation of mythical tradition in the
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face of cold and unfeeling reason. Yet it had done so without challenging the Enlightenment’s
underlying premise that myth and tradition, on the one hand, and reason on the other were
somehow at odds. Romanticism, Gadamer argued, simply rejected the Enlightenment’s
preference for reason in favor of a preference for myth.
Thus historicism, which emerged from Romanticism’s preservationist impulse, had
unwittingly inherited the Enlightenment’s preference for methodological knowledge. For this
reason, despite being superficially in conflict, historicism and Enlightenment rationalism were
able to develop symbiotically: historical explanation became the detour that reason could take
when reason alone failed to explain a phenomenon or text in purely rational terms. “If the
Enlightenment considers it an established fact that all tradition that reason shows to be
impossible (i.e., nonsense) can only be understood historically—i.e., by going back to the past’s
way of looking at things—then the historical consciousness that emerges in Romanticism
involves a radicalization of the Enlightenment,” Gadamer wrote.37 As the case of Dilthey had
showed, historicism had culminated in the paradoxical effort to find a universal and ahistorical
method for understanding that which was manifestly particular and historical—namely, the past
and its tradition.
But was such a method possible? Not, Gadamer recognized, according to Heidegger’s
analysis. If understanding is Dasein’s native condition in the world, then prejudice is always a
component of understanding. Historicism promised too much when it offered a method to
achieve a completely unprejudiced understanding of the past. A historical hermeneutics that was
sensitive to Heidegger’s claims would have to surrender this claim to offer an ahistorical,
unprejudiced vantage point onto the past and come to terms with the reality of prejudice in
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understanding. In other words, it would have to recognize the reality of facticity, that an
interpreter belongs to a work that he did not create, yet which did create him. “In fact history
does not belong to us; we belong to it,” Gadamer wrote. “The focus on subjectivity is a distorting
mirror. The self awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical
life… That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the
historical reality of his being.”38

Authority and Tradition
The question facing hermeneutics, then, was not how to eliminate prejudice from
understanding altogether but how to discriminate between legitimate prejudices and illegitimate
ones—a question that appeared meaningless within the logic of Enlightenment epistemology.
Legitimate prejudices, Gadamer argued, were prejudices that we accept on the basis of legitimate
authority. But the concept of authority, like the concept of prejudice, required philosophical
rehabilitation. By the Enlightenment’s epistemological standards, a judgment that one accepts on
the basis of authority—the authority of the Church, or an intellectual—was always a prejudice,
since it had not been subjected to an individual’s rational judgement. But Gadamer denied such a
hard antithesis between authority and reason. Instead, he argued that recognizing an authority
was itself an act of judgement. “[Authority] rests on acknowledgment and hence on an act of
reason itself which, aware of its own limitations, trusts to the better insight of others,” he wrote.
“Authority in this sense, properly understood, has nothing to do with blind obedience to
commands.”39 One could grant authority to an individual, for example, on the basis of a
judgment that that person had arrived at a more perspicacious understanding than one’s own, or
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to an institution on the basis of its trustworthiness. Of course, it remains the true that much
authority persists through sheer intellectual inertia, coercion, or suppression, but Gadamer denied
that these so-called authorities were authorities in a true sense. In fact, this had been precisely the
Enlightenment’s error: to discredit the concept of authority as a whole on the basis of illegitimate
authorities.
Aside from institutions or individuals, Gadamer argued that tradition itself could serve as
a source of legitimate prejudices. “That which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has
an authority that is nameless, and our finite historical being is marked by the fact that the
authority of what has been handed down to us—and not just what is clearly grounded—always
has power over our attitudes and behaviors,” he wrote.40 Nor was judgement totally absent from
tradition: “Preservation,” Gadamer wrote, “is as much a freely chosen action as are revolution
and renewal.”41 It is important to note, however, that Gadamer has adopted the term “tradition”
only to drastically revise its meaning, much like he did with “prejudice.” For Gadamer, tradition
was more than a canon of texts or a set of tried-and-true interpretive practices; it was the whole
force of past ideas and texts, something approaching the all-encompassing nature of Heidegger’s
facticity. For Gadamer, the force of tradition made certain subjects and texts appear as inherently
meaningful while others did not. The effect of tradition was evident, for example, in a historian’s
choice of a subject of inquiry. As Gadamer wrote, “The real fulfillment of the historical task is to
determine the significance of what is examined. But the significance exists at the beginning of
any such research as well as at the end: in choosing the theme to be investigated, awakening the
desire to investigate, gaining a new problematic.” 42 In this respect, Gadamer argued that no
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historian or interpreter could entirely escape the effect of tradition. To do so would mean living
in a world where nothing appeared innately significant or meaningful.
Aside from individual or institutional authority, Gadamer argued, tradition itself could
serve as a source of legitimate prejudices. “That which has been sanctioned by tradition and
custom has an authority that is nameless, and our finite historical being is marked by the fact that
the authority of what has been handed down to us—and not just what is clearly grounded—
always has power over our attitudes and behaviors,” he wrote.43 In the case of tradition, the
antithesis between reason and authority falls apart: “Preservation is as much a freely chosen
action as are revolution and renewal.”44 Here, again, Gadamer appropriated a familiar term—
“tradition”—only to drastically revise its meaning. For Gadamer, tradition: it directs our care. As
finite beings, we do not encounter a limitless field of questions and subjects towards which we
can direct our care and attention. Certain things present themselves as immediately significant to
us independent of our choice to direct our attention towards them. Gadamer wrote, “The real
fulfillment of the historical task is to determine the significance of what is examined. But the
significance exists at the beginning of any such research as well as at the end: in choosing the
theme to be investigated, awakening the desire to investigate, gaining a new problematic.” 45
Tradition determines what appears as significant to us, what presents itself to us as worthy of and
in need of our attention. Understood in this sense, it makes as little sense to speak of escaping the
effects of tradition as it does to speak about living in the world in a completely disinterested and
dispassionate way. Tradition determines our basic orientation of care towards the world.
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And no species of understanding—the human sciences included––escape its effects. But
what exactly does it mean for the human sciences to manifest the effect of tradition? Gadamer
used a comparison between the logic of the human sciences and the logic of the natural sciences
to demonstrate this point. In the natural sciences, the history of past discoveries within a given
field of research—the history of pre-Pasteurian germ theory, for example—has no necessary
epistemological bearing on new discoveries in that field; the epistemic value of a discovery is
independent of what came before it. But this is not the case in the human sciences. Although
historians have to adapt their analyses to new evidence, the character of a new analysis remains
crucially connected to the work that came before it. Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire, for example, remains an indispensable part of the study of antiquity, even though
contemporary historians have falsified much of its evidence and rejected nearly all of its
substantive conclusions. Yet as a part of the tradition that shaped past and present inquiry, it still
offers insights that contemporary historians care about and have to contend with. “Our historical
consciousness is always filled with a variety of voices in which the echo of the past is heard,”
Gadamer wrote. “Only in the multifariousness of such voices does it exist: this constitutes the
nature of the tradition in which we want to share and have a part.” 46
This contrast gets to the heart of the difference that Gadamer identified between the
natural and human sciences, and it provides a clue to why the human sciences in particular must
embrace the reality of tradition. Unlike in the natural sciences, Gadamer argued, the human
science’s objects of inquiry—i.e. the past and past events—do not exist ontically independent of
inquiries into them; they are not objects-in-themelves in the same way that molecules or planets
are. Gadamer wrote, “Whereas the object of the natural sciences can be described idealiter as
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what would be known in the perfect knowledge of nature, it is senseless to speak of perfect
knowledge of history, and for this reason it is not possible to speak of an ‘object in itself’
towards which its research is directed.”47 The historical object exists only in mediation, in the
way it presents itself via tradition as an object of contemporary interest: “[I]n the human sciences
the particular research questions concerning tradition that we are interested in pursuing are
motivated in a special way by the present and its interest,” Gadamer wrote. “The theme and
object of research are actually constituted by the motivation of the inquiry.” 48 Only when the
human sciences cease to chase the phantom of the historical object does their true nature as the
mediation of tradition become clear.

Understanding as an Event
What effect, then, does belonging to a tradition have on understanding? Gadamer found
an answer to this question in Heidegger’s reinterpretation of the hermeneutic circle as an
ontological description of all understanding. Recall that Gadamer, following Heidegger,
described understanding as the projection and revision of anticipatory fore-conceptions and foreunderstandings. As a reader interprets, he foregrounds his own prejudices while remaining open
to the text in its alterity. This might seem like a purely psychological description of what takes
place in all understanding, but Gadamer took his analysis one step further, forcing understanding
out of the head of the interpreter by re-describing it as an act of participation in what he called
“an event of tradition.”
Here, the metaphor of an interpreter existing within a tradition proved particularly apt.
Gadamer argued that we do not come to care for historical objects through self-sustained acts of
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mental willpower; we know and care about the past because its effect manifests in tradition.
Stated negatively, the lacunae of tradition do not appear to us lacunae because they do not appear
to us at all. We have no care for them. Conversely, every object that does appear as a potential
object of historical interest already belongs to the tradition to which we also belong. Before we
even select an object as the theme of a historical inquiry, Gadamer argued, we already exist in a
relationship with it that exceeds idle curiosity. “Hermeneutics must start from the position that a
person seeking to understand something has a bond to the subject matter that comes into
language through the traditional text and has, or acquires, a connection with the tradition from
which the text speaks,” he wrote.49 Tradition bestows prejudices upon us that make certain
objects appear to be more meaningful and significant than others.
This does not mean, however, that we have some prophetic, intuitive understanding of
traditionary texts. Despite the fact that both the interpreter and traditionary texts belong to the
same tradition, the distance between an interpreter’s fore-meaning and the meaning of the text
might be, and often is, great. As Gadamer wrote, “Hermeneutical consciousness is aware that its
bond to this subject matter does not consist in some self-evident, unquestioned unanimity, as is
the case with the unbroken stream of tradition.” 50 To the contrary, the fundamental
hermeneutical experience is the experience of tension in a text between the familiar and the
foreign: “It is the play between the traditionary text’s strangeness and familiar to us, between
being a historically intended, distances object and belonging to a tradition,” Gadamer wrote.
“The true locus of hermeneutics is this in-between.”51
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Yet making sense of this in-between requires going beyond the subjectivity of the
interpreter. In this respect, Gadamer’s re-description of the hermeneutic situation added another
valence to the hermeneutical circle as an ontological description of understanding: the circle now
not only describes the process of projecting and adapting fore-meanings and fore-conceptions,
but also the movement of understanding between familiarity and foreignness. It follows that
hermeneutics, as the description of the process of understanding, must take account both of the
historical situation of the interpreter himself, which determines what appears as familiar to him,
and of the historical situation of the text, which is the source of its foreignness. Fundamentally,
hermeneutics is concerned not with one of the one situation or the other but with the relationship
between the two, what Gadamer called the “temporal distance” between them. “[Hermeneutics]
must foreground what has remained entirely peripheral in previous hermeneutics: temporal
distance and its significance for understanding,” wrote Gadamer.52
For Gadamer, temporal distance was a boon to understanding rather than a barrier. This
was not an entirely new idea. Historicist hermeneutics, for example, had long maintained that
temporal distance played an essential role in understanding, insofar as it served to strip away all
the local prejudices and preconceptions that might stand in the way of an interpreter coming to
an objective understanding a text. Yet Gadamer denied that this was its real productivity, arguing
instead that temporal distance was itself productive of meaning, insofar as the passage of time
allowed subsequent interpreters to ask new questions of a text and discover new meanings in it.
As Gadamer put it, meaning of a text “not just occasionally but always…goes beyond its
author.”53 In this respect, Gadamer argued, an author could not claim a privileged understanding
of the meaning of his text. To the contrary, he had only a single, limited grasp of its meaning.
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Subsequent interpreters, approaching a text with their own sets of questions and interests, do not
merely fail to discover its original meaning; they in fact discover and generate new meanings
from the text. “Every age has to understand a transmitted text in its own way, for the text belongs
to the whole tradition whose content interests the age and in which it seeks to understand itself,”
wrote Gadamer.54 “…It is enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand
at all.”55
In Gadamer’s final analysis, understanding, like meaning itself, appeared a historical
phenomenon. Rather than “mysterious communion of souls” or the translocation of minds across
time, understanding was an historical event, embedded in time just like the Battle of Marathon or
the fall of the Berlin Wall. This fact served as the crux of Gadamer’s new philosophical
hermeneutics. “Real historical thinking must take account of its own historicity,” Gadamer
wrote. “A hermeneutics adequate to the subject matter would have to demonstrate the reality and
efficacy of history within understanding itself.” 56 Gadamer called this type of historicallysensitive history Wirkungsgeschichte, or the history of effect.

Historically Effected Consciousness and the Fusion of Horizons
It was clear to Gadamer that his thematization of understanding as an historical event
challenged historicism’s claim to offer a timeless and objective understanding of the past. Yet it
fell to philosophical hermeneutics to offer a better description of historical consciousness that
took systematic account of the efficacy of history within understanding itself—what he called
“the history of effect.” Gadamer made clear that he neither expected nor desired for the history
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of effect to become a scholarly discipline in its own right. The particular power of history over
our understanding, he argued, was that it remained operative whether or not we are conscious of
it. To try to sequester it in a separate discipline would only prove futile. From the standpoint of
philosophical hermeneutics, the important thing was that the human sciences incorporate the
history of effect into their own methodological self-consciousness, so as to avoid either actively
denying historicity altogether (as the methodological sciences had done) or believing that, having
become aware of its power, they could transcend it through an act of self-consciousness (as
Dilthey’s historicism had tried to do).
Gadamer called this new historical consciousness “historically effected consciousness,”
or, more literally, “consciousness that has been effected by history.” (wirkungsgeschichtliches
Bewußtsein). He argued that this consciousness had a three-fold structure: first, it was, like all
consciousness, affected by history; second, it was aware of being thus affected; and, most
importantly, it was aware that being thus affected created inescapable limits for its own selfunderstanding. Unlike historicism’s historical consciousness, which sought to transcend its
historical situation to achieve a timeless perspective on the past, Gadamer’s historically effected
consciousness was a radically finite consciousness. “To be historically means that knowledge of
oneself cannot be complete,” Gadamer wrote. “All self-knowledge arises from what is
historically pregiven…and hence both prescribes and limits every possibility for understanding
any tradition whatsoever in its historical alterity.” 57 When Gadamer said that self awareness is
only ever a flicker in the closed circuits of historical life, he meant it literally. The historically
effected consciousness had come to terms with the fact that the sum total of historical self
awareness illuminated only a very small patch of historical being.
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But what did it mean for such a consciousness to understand at all? Faced with this
question, Gadamer returned to Husserl’s concept of the horizon. Husserl had used the spatial
metaphor of the horizon to illustrate the nature of time-consciousness, in which discreet
intentional experiences appeared against an implicit background of past and future experience.
While retaining Husserl’s sense of the horizon as a limited yet ever-present backdrop to being,
Gadamer adapted Husserl’s concept to describe the nature of finite, historical understanding.
Like experience itself, Gadamer argued, understanding takes place within a horizon of meaning:
“The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular
vantage point,” wrote Gadamer. “A person who has a horizon knows the relative significance of
everything within this horizon, whether it is near or far, great or small.”58 Historicism had
correctly recognized that historical texts and event occupied their own distinct horizons, and that
interpreters made a mistake when they naively approached a text as though it existed within their
more immediate horizon. And yet, Gadamer charged, historicism had erred in arguing that the
horizon of the text and the horizon of the interpreter were completely separate, such that an
interpreter could transport himself from his own horizon behind into the horizon of the text. As
the very concept of the horizon implies, an individual never fully gets beyond his horizon; when
we move, the horizon moves with us. Like attempting to escape the effect of tradition, attempting
to abandon one’s horizon of meaning would require surrendering the possibility of understanding
a text at all. “We think we understand when we see the past from a historical standpoint—i.e.,
transpose ourselves into the historical situation and try to reconstruct the historical horizon,
Gadamer wrote. “In fact, however, we have given up the claim to find in the past any truth that is
valid and intelligible for ourselves.”59
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But if historical understanding does not require adopting an entirely new horizon, then
what does it entail? Gadamer described the movement of understanding with the powerful
metaphor of the “fusion of horizons.”60 Yet this central concept of Gadamer’s hermeneutics
remains somewhat misleading. For Gadamer, a historical horizon was, by necessity, single and
unified. “Everything contained in historical consciousness is in fact embraced by a single
historical horizon,” he wrote. “Our own past and that other past towards which our historical
consciousness is directed help to shape this moving horizon out of which human life always lives
and which determines its heritage and tradition.” 61 Yet if the horizon is singular, how can
horizons fuse? Gadamer argued that despite the ultimate unity of our historical horizon, a
sensitive interpreter projects a distinct historical horizon around a text in order to prevent him
from allowing his fore-understandings to obscure the foreign or unfamiliar elements of a text,
thereby mistakenly assimilating them to his own fore-meanings. But the projection of this
distinct horizon, like Husserl’s act of intentional consciousness, represented only an intermediate
step on the way to genuine understanding: “As the historical horizon is projected, it is
simultaneously superseded,” wrote Gadamer. “To bring about this fusion in a regulated way is
the task for what we called historically effected consciousness.”62
Genuine understanding occurs, Gadamer argued, when the projected horizon of the text
and the horizon of the interpreter fused into a single, broader, and more comprehensive horizon.
“[Understanding] always involves rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only our
own particularly but also that of the other,” wrote Gadamer. 63 The horizon that results from this
fusion does not offer a static or limitless perspective, but it does represent a more
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comprehensive, and therefore improved, vantage point. “To acquire a horizon means that one
learns to look beyond what is close at hand—not in order to look away from it but to see it better,
within a larger whole and in truest proportions,” Gadamer wrote.64

Application
Gadamer’s explication of the structure of understanding as the fusion of horizons
retrieved a fundamental hermeneutical problem that Romantic and historicist hermeneutics had
obscured: the problem of application. Application had been of central importance to traditional
hermeneutics, which understood interpretation as a guide to the proper application either of the
gospel (in the case of scriptural hermeneutics), the normative standards of antiquity (in the case
of classical philology), or the law, (in the case of legal hermeneutics). By contrast, historicist
hermeneutics had divorced interpretation from application by limiting the hermeneutic task to
making sense of a text as a purely historical artifact. But this distinction between understanding,
interpretation, and application, Gadamer argued, became untenable for the historically effected
consciousness. “Our thesis is that historical hermeneutics too has a task of application to
perform, because it too serves applicable meaning, in that it explicitly and consciously bridges
the temporal distance that separates the interpreter from the text and overcomes the alienation of
meaning that the text has undergone,” Gadamer wrote.65 Like the performing of a symphony,
handing down a judicial verdict, or preaching of the gospel, understanding a text requires making
it speak in a new context. It fundamentally involves application.
Gadamer provided two models of application that illustrated its role in hermeneutic
activity. The first was Aristotle’s conception of moral knowledge, or phronesis, from the
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Nicomachean Ethics. In the Ethics, Aristotle distinguished moral knowledge from two other
types of knowledge—theoretical knowledge (episteme) and practical knowledge (teche)—on the
basis of the internal relationship within each type of knowledge between the universal and the
particular. For Artistotle, episteme, was knowledge of timeless universals—the prime example
being mathematics. Insofar as episteme concerned particulars, it concerned them only as
instantiations of universal principles. Moreover, as the study of universals, episteme was the
product of pure contemplation, not of experience, which was always the experience of
particulars. By contrast, Aristotle identified techne, or technical knowledge, as the type of
knowledge concerned with the proper application of universal principles to particular
situations—the paradigmatic example for Aristotle was the craftsman, whose knowledge of some
universal, i.e., the concept of a chair in the abstract, guides his action in a particular situation,
i.e., his process of constructing a singular chair. Unlike episteme, techne resulted from both
contemplation and experience, since contemplation contributes to the knowledge of the
universal, while experience guides its application in practice.
What type of knowledge, then, was phronesis, or moral knowledge? Clearly it was not
episteme, because its object was the changing world of human affairs, not the unchanging realm
of the eternal. But neither was it techne. Although moral knowledge, like technical knowledge,
concerned the application of a universal principles to particular situations, in could not be
described on the model of the craftsman comparing his finished product to his blueprint. In moral
knowledge, the universal that one aims to arrive at (moral goodness in Aristotle’s case) does not
exist as an object of knowledge prior to the task of applying it in the same way that a blueprint
exists before the chair itself. Rather, the universal becomes manifest only through the experience
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of trying to determine how it arises in a particular circumstance. The existence of the universal
depends on its application in practice.
It was this quality of Aristotle’s moral knowledge that Gadamer found most compelling
as a description of the hermeneutic project. Just as a moral actor does not first grasp what
morality demands of him and then applies that demand to his situation, an interpreter of a text
does not first understand the meaning of the text and then apply its meaning to his particular
historical situation. In both cases, the knowledge of the universal is revealed through the act of
application. Although moral agents generally hold some conception of what goodness in the
abstract demands of them—just as an interpreter might have a general conception of the
significance of a text—that knowledge is always vulnerable to revision. Certainly, a craftsman
can compare a blueprint for a chair to the chair itself after the fact of production, determine how
they differ, and adapt future blueprints on that basis. But it makes no sense to speak of moral
knowledge or interpretation in this way, because the mechanism of adaptation is a constitutive
part of the knowledge itself. Every act of application is an act of revision.
Gadamer’s second example was legal hermeneutics. From the vantage point of
historicism, the task of a legal interpreter, say, a judge or a jury member, differs fundamentally
from the task of the legal historian. The judge attempts to understand the meaning of a law so as
to apply it to the facts of the case before him. He must have a sense of the historical development
of the law, but his historical knowledge only serves as a guide to proper application. By contrast,
the legal historian attempts to understand a law’s significance both in its original situation and in
the changing circumstances in which it has been applied across time. His concern is with the
law’s historical value, not its applicability for the present. But Gadamer argued that this sharp
division between the task of the judge and the task of the historian falls apart under scrutiny. In
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attempting to understand a text, be it a law or an historical document, historians always do what
judges do: they understand the significance by applying it within their horizon of meaning.
Gadamer wrote, “Historical knowledge can be gained only by seeing the past in its continuity
with the present—which is exactly what the jurist does in his practical, normative work of
‘ensuring the unbroken continuance of law and preserving the traditions of the legal idea.’” 66
Although the task of the judge might seem like a specialized case of understanding, since the
laws that he interprets are still in force, whereas the laws that historians attempt to understand are
no longer binding, Gadamer argued that the opposite was in fact true: the example of the legal
historian serves as the rule, while the task of the historian serves as the exception. “Trying to
understand the law in terms of its historical origin, the historian can not disregard its continuing
effect,” Gadamer writes. “It presents him with the questions that he has to ask of historical
tradition.”67
Following these examples, Gadamer concluded that consciousness did not discriminate
between judges, historians, philologists, or scriptural exegetes. All varieties of hermeneutical
practice found their inner unity in the task of application.

Experience and Dialogue
Gadamer was not content merely to demonstrate the effect of history in every act of
understanding. In addition, he attempted to demonstrate and analyze its productivity—that is, to
show how historicity is actually generative of understanding. Here, it is useful to remember the
three-fold nature of historically effected consciousness as consciousness that is affected by
history, and aware of being thus affected, and aware of the limitations that this places on
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understanding. Gadamer’s account of the fusion of horizons served as an account of historically
effected consciousness in its first and third elements, but it failed as an account of the second.
Gadamer took care to distinguish the type of reflexivity that characterized historically
effected consciousness from the self-reflexive stance of speculative idealism. For idealists such
as Hegel, all historical knowledge was self-knowledge, insofar as the encounter with history
represented the encounter of mind with itself. Against Hegel, Gadamer maintained that historical
knowledge was a kind of experience, the encounter of mind with something other than itself.
“[W]e are concerned to conceive a reality that limits and exceeds the omnipotence of reflection,”
Gadamer wrote. “[T]he historical activity of the mind is neither self-reflection nor the merely
formal dialectical supersession of the self-alienation that is has undergone, but an experience
[Erfahrung] that experiences reality and is itself real.”68 For Gadamer, historical knowledge was
not merely speculative; the mind could not simply think itself into historical knowledge.
Instead, Gadamer argued that there is an element of genuine experience in every instance
of historical knowledge. But what is the nature of this experience, and how does it become an
experience of limitation rather than of self-knowledge? The methodological natural sciences
offer one model of experience, developed by analogy with inductive reasoning. In the natural
sciences, singular experiences stand as individual data points that can be confirmed or refuted by
subsequent experiences. Experience in this sense is teleological, since it aims at the formation of
true concepts: the accumulation of individual experiences represents the progression from
accidental experiences of particulars to true conceptual knowledge a phenomenon as a whole.
Empirical experiments represent the ideal distillation of experience, insofar as they allow for the
regulated accumulation of experiences directed towards the formation of true concepts. Most
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importantly, experience is only experience insofar as it leads to knowledge. Gadamer writes,
“Experience is valid only if it is confirmed; hence its dignity depends on its being in principle
repeatable. But this means that by its very nature, experience abolishes its history and thus
itself.”69 In theory, once one has reached true knowledge of a universal concept, experience in
this specific sense can end.
Gadamer argued that this teleological construal of experience truncated its true nature and
misconstrued its real purpose. “If we regard experience in terms of its results, we have ignored
the fact that experience is a process…It cannot be described simply as the unbroken generation
of typical universals,” he wrote. “Rather, this generation takes place as false generalizations are
continually refuted by experience and what was regarded as typical is shown not to be so.” 70 For
Gadamer, the experience was not teleological but dialectical; its essential movement was
reversal, not progression. Although the confirmation of previous experiences certainly remained
a component of experience in general, of more fundamental importance was its negation, or the
reversal of consciousness that one experiences when he changes his mind. Thus experience in
general, Gadamer argued, leads not to knowledge but to more experience. “[The experienced
person] proves to be… someone who is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many
experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly equipped to
have new experiences and to learn from them,” Gadamer wrote. “The dialectic of experience has
its proper fulfillment not in definitive knowledge but in the openness to experience that is made
possible by experience itself.”71 Like the process of fore-meaning, fore-conception and fore-
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projection that characterizes our understanding of texts, experience progresses by way of the
continual disappointment and re-adaptation of our expectations.
In this respect, Gadamer inverted the relationship between experience and knowledge that
the theory of induction implied: experience does not lead to knowledge so much as knowledge
always leads back to experience. For Gadamer, the real productivity of experience was not that it
dissolved into knowledge of some universal concept (as was true on the inductive model) or that
it culminated in absolute self-knowledge (as Hegel argued), but that it manifested the reality of
consciousness’s limitedness. “Real experience is that whereby man becomes aware of his
finiteness,” Gadamer wrote. “In it are discovered the limits of the power and the self-knowledge
of his planning reason.”72 To discover in experience itself the effects of human finitude was, for
Gadamer, to experience concretely the reality of history. “The idea that everything can be
reversed, that there is always time for everything and that everything somehow returns, proves to
be an illusion,” Gadamer wrote. “Rather, the person who is situated and acts in history
continually experiences the fact that nothing returns.”73
Gadamer found in this model of experience more generally a model for hermeneutical
experience in particular, or experience that concerned tradition and texts. Like experience in
general, hermeneutic experience involves a fundamental openness to new experiences, not a
search for fixed knowledge. In the case of textual interpretation, Gadamer argued, this means
that an interpreter approaches a text not as an object of inquiry but as a “Thou,” an entity that,
like a person, stands in relationship of exchange with the interpreter. “In human relations the
important thing is… to experience the Thou truly as a Thou—i.e., not to overlook his claim but
to let him really say something to us,” Gadamer wrote. “[Historically effected consciousness]
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allow[s] tradition’s claim to validity, not in the sense of simply acknowledging the past in its
otherness, but in such a way that it has something to say to me.” 74 The historically effected
consciousness, in other words, is prepared for a text to tell him something new—something that
shifts his horizon of meaning.
Because hermeneutic consciousness maintains the legitimacy of tradition as a Thou rather
than as an object, Gadamer argued that the whole hermeneutic enterprise was best understood as
a dialogue or conversation. This was not merely a useful metaphor for Gadamer: he actually
argued that hermeneutics and dialogue share a common logic, which he called the logic of
question and answer. Gadamer’s model for this logic of question and answer was Plato’s
dialogues. Like Socrates’ encounters with his interlocutor, Gadamer argued, a reader’s encounter
with tradition begins with the raising of a question. The defining feature of that question is that it
introduced uncertainty where there had previous been only certainty. “The significance of
questioning consists in revealing the questionability of what is questioned,” Gadamer wrote. “It
has to be brought into this state of indeterminacy, in which there is an equilibrium between pro
and contra.”75 Like Socrates’ bewildering lines of questioning, the purpose of hermeneutic
exchange was to deliver interlocutors to common meanings and concepts, not to resolve into
definite stalemates. “As the art of asking a question, dialectic proves its value because only the
person who knows how to ask a question is able to persist in this questioning, which involves
being able to preserve his orientation towards openness,” wrote Gadamer. “The art of
questioning is the art of questioning even further—i.e., the art of thinking.”76 Like experience
itself, dialogue leads not to answers but to more questions.
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In this respect, Gadamer argued, all hermeneutics was dialogue. An interpreter’s
engagement with a text begins when it poses a question; to understand a text requires first
understanding this question. But the hermeneutic task does not end there. Aside from posing a
question, every text also represents an answer to an historical question. 77 It is the job of the
interpreter, in a limited sense, to recover this question, but it is also his task to remain open to the
question that the text poses to him. In this process, the question to which a text is an answer and
the question that the text posed to a reader ultimately merge in the reader’s attempt to grasp them
both. “A reconstructed question can never stand within its original horizon: for the historical
horizon that circumscribed the reconstruction is…included within the horizon that embraces us
as the questioners who have been encountered by the traditionary word,” Gadamer wrote. “Only
in an inauthentic sense can we talk about understanding questions that one does not pose
oneself…To understanding a question is to ask it.” 78 In discovering the question that lies latent in
the text, the reader cannot help but ask it of himself.
Here, at last, the productivity of history in understanding comes into full relief. The
knowledge that belongs to the historically effected consciousness is the type of knowledge that
arises from dialogue. It is the knowledge of a being who belongs to a tradition, who moves
within a horizon that moves with him. It is knowledge that always breaks off into indeterminacy
and anticipates change. As Gadamer wrote, “It is part of the historical finitude of our being that
we are aware that others after us will understand in a different way…This is the truth of
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historically effected consciousness. By renouncing the chimera of perfect enlightenment, it is
open to the experience of history.”79
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Chapter Two
GADAMER’S ENCOUNTERS: PART ONE
Transitioning from an account of Gadamer’s ideas to an account of Gadamer’s life
inevitability raises some hermeneutical difficulties. As Gadamer’s biographer Jean Grondin has
argued, Gadamer almost certainly would have objected on philosophical grounds to any analysis
of his philosophy that gave significant explanatory power to his biography. Gadamer’s
hermeneutics, Grondin points out, challenge this tendency to read a philosopher’s work as a
product of his life experiences. To do so, Gadamer would argue, is to deny the autonomy of a
text or a work of art, depriving it of the ability to stand forth in its claim to truth.
“[H]ermeneutics might well view biography as a purely historical undertaking, confining itself to
the interplay of historical contexts and influences, and thereby ignoring the truth content that
these historical forces have brought to the fore,” Grondin writes. “The interplay of influences,
tacitly modeled on the interplay of forces in the nomoethical physical sciences, [Gadamer]
alleged, is alien to truth and to the thing itself.”1
Faced with these objections, can an intellectual biographer proceed in his task without
flagrantly violating Gadamer’s philosophical imperatives? Grondin thinks he can. The key, he
argues, lies in documenting a philosopher’s life in a way that preserves the dialectical and
historical character of experience, as Gadamer conceived of it. Grondin writes:

The main idea of hermeneutics is just this: every statement must be understood as an
answer to a question. And every philosophy is a statement. What question is it driven by?
It would [be] mistaken to think that this amounts to a historical relativization of truth. The
opposite is the case, and this can be viewed as a fundamental hermeneutical insight: no
statement can be understood without regard to its truth, if one does not begin with the
need that is endeavoring to come to expression. 2
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The dialectical nature of experience takes on another, more complex dimension when
applied to the problem of reception. Unlike intellectual biography, which is concerned
principally with retrieving the original question to which a philosopher’s work offers an answer,
reception history explores the encounter between two sets of questions and answers: those of a
text and those of an agent of reception. In this respect, Gadamer’s analysis of understanding as
the fusion of horizons serves as an instructive interpretive guide. For Gadamer, one’s horizon of
meaning is always a thing in flux, “something into which we move and that moves with us.” 3
Despite the appearance of plural horizons of meaning, Gadamer insisted, a horizon is never
“closed”: “Just as the individual is never simply an individual because he is always
understanding with others, so too the closed horizon that is supposed to enclose a culture is an
abstraction,” wrote Gadamer in Truth and Method. “The historical movement of human life
consists in the fact that it is never absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never
have a truly closed horizon.”4 A horizon is constantly running up against other horizons; it is
defined by its reception.
With this in mind, Gadamer’s analysis suggests two methodological principles for
reception history more generally. First, a history of reception must take account of both the
horizon of meaning of the text that is being received and the horizon of the agent who is
receiving it. In this respect, the structure of reception is essentially dialogical: it involves an
exchange between two parties, each occupying their own, partially distinct horizon. Yet the
distance between these two horizons is not the real focus of reception. It is, rather, understanding
itself, the fusion of horizon that takes place when dialogue “ris[es] to a higher universality that
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overcomes not only [one’s] own particularly but also that of the other.”5 In this respect, a
genuinely hermeneutical history of reception must resist the tendency to displace the real object
of inquiry with the personalities and idiosyncrasies of the inquirers. As Grondin notes, this was
Gadamer’s true fear: that an overweening interest in biography would obscure the truth that
emerges in dialogue.
Seen in this light, the history of the reception of Gadamerian hermeneutics in North
America is best understood not as the story of a man but as the story of a conversation, a
dialogue about the nature of meaning, understanding, and interpretation. I have chosen to
structure the narrative of this conversation around a series of four events of reception, which I
would like to call, as a term of art, “encounters.” As I use it, an encounter is the locus of
reception, a moment when two horizons of meaning converge and fuse. Some of the encounters I
discuss were meetings in a literal sense: discrete moments in time when Gadamer engaged
directly in philosophical dialogue with an interlocutor. Others are encounters in a looser sense:
written or verbal exchanges that took place over an extended period of time, as Gadamer and
other philosophers directed their thinking toward common questions and attempted to arrive at a
shared understanding and answers. In either case, my purpose in exploring these encounters has
not been to declare a victor or to show how one participant emerged with the upper hand. Rather,
it has been to reconstruct what Gadamer identified as the “event of understanding” that takes
place in genuine dialogue, an event that reveals a previously unrealized meaning of a text. It is
this dynamic—of adaptation and agreement, dialectic and disclosure—that I have tried to
emphasize with my focus on Gadamer’s encounters.
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Ultimately, my account seeks to open up the possibilities for dialogue that Gadamer’s
reception in America created, not to reach definitive conclusions about Gadamer’s influence. The
history of reception, more so perhaps than traditional diachronic history, constantly manifests the
reality of what Gadamer called the history of effect: that historical understanding is inextricable
from an agent’s involvement in the very history that he attempts to understand. Because every
act of reception is an act of re-reception, a definitive history of reception inevitably eludes an
historian’s attempt to pin it down. As Gadamer wrote at the end of Truth and Method, “The
ongoing dialogue permits no final conclusion. It would be a poor hermeneuticist who thought he
could have, or had to have, the last word.”6

2.1 FROM HEIDELBERG TO AMERICA
Gadamer’s presence in America spanned approximately eighteen years, from 1968, when
he first set foot on American soil, to 1986, when, plagued by poor health, he retired to
Heidelberg. To everyone except Gadamer, his initial trip to the United States was supposed to
serve as his scholarly swan song. In February of 1968, after nearly fifty years of continuous
teaching and scholarship, Gadamer formally stepped down from his post as chair of the
philosophy department at the University of Heidelberg. At the time, the university was unable to
find a suitable replacement for Gadamer—apparently scholars equally well versed in Plato and
contemporary phenomenology were few and far between—so Gadamer, then sixty-eight years
old, agreed to retain all of his teaching duties until the winter of 1969-70. Yet without the
responsibilities of his chair, Gadamer suddenly found himself with an abundance of free time. At
the urging of his wife Käthe, he accepted an invitation to deliver a paper at a conference on
Schleiermacher at Vanderbilt University.
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In early February, he wrote to Heidegger:
In order to bridge the hiatus of becoming emeritus, I have accepted an invitation to the
USA and will be in transit from the middle of February to Easter. Over there it is not my
philosophy, of course, that makes them interested in me—for them I am not even an oldtimer worth seeing. But precisely this fact about philosophy over there has given my
book an unexpected relevance among theologians and students of the
Geisteswissenschaften (especially the criticists). In it they see a justification of their own
needs that are left unsatisfied by philosophy of science. 7
Gadamer was correct in thinking that American audiences had developed an interest in his work.
After Truth and Method had appeared in 1960, he had received a number of invitations to lecture
in the United States, but his demanding teaching and administrative duties, as well as his limited
proficiency in English, had prevented him from making the trans-Atlantic trip.8 By 1969,
Gadamer’s English had improved enough, thanks to an informal conversation group organized
by Ernst Tugendhat, that he judged a trip to be worthwhile, and in mid-February, the airplaneaverse Gadamer set sail for Tennessee aboard the Queen Elizabeth.
Upon his arrival, however, Gadamer’s participation in the conference proved limited. In
reality, his English remained quite poor, and he requested that the text of his address, entitled
“The Problem of Language in Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutics,” be translated into English—an
unusual request for him, given that he almost never prepared lecture notes when teaching in
German. Yet Gadamer struggled even with the prepared English text, and he decided midway
through his address to attempt to speak extemporaneously.9 He fared little better without notes.
“The only thing that reassured him was that in his eyes, or rather ears, Gerard Ebeling’s English
was even worse than his own,” Grondin wrote of the conference.10
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The experience of running up against the language barrier troubled Gadamer. Attuned as
he was to the difficulties and distortions of translation, he knew that reading from a pre-prepared
script was a poor substitute for spontaneous philosophical dialogue. “I attempted to give my
lectures in English and without manuscript, for, in my view, lecturing and especially teaching in
the U.S. and Canada would be meaningless if I could not somehow give expression to my own
style of thinking in English,” he later wrote.11 If he was to continue to teach in the United States,
Gadamer would have to find a way to express his ideas in a way that remained true to his
concepts while being sensitive to the linguistic and philosophical distance between himself and
his audience—that is, in a genuinely hermeneutical way.
Despite his shaky beginnings in Tennessee, Gadamer continued his inaugural tour of the
States, re-delivering his paper on Schleiermacher, as well as papers titled “Image and Word” and
“The Concept of the Divine in Pre-Socratic Philosophy” at a number of universities around the
country, including the University of Texas, Johns Hopkins, Yale, Harvard, and the University of
Chicago.12 His extended stay improved his language skills, and by the end of the trip, he had
grown comfortable delivering lectures in English. Along the way, he encountered much more
enthusiasm for his and Heidegger’s philosophy than he had anticipated, especially among the
younger generation of students. After returning to Heidelberg in April, he wrote to Heidegger:
For some time I have been wanting to send you a more detailed report of my impression
in America, but at the same time I was hoping that you might want to spend a summer
break in Heidelberg…At least this much: in America you have long been and still are
enrolled in the series of uncontested classics of philosophy. Especially the young people
in many places are spiritually far beyond the technological wave…In Yale I was asked
everywhere whether there was any prospect of bringing you in for a semester—of course
without any obligation…It always looked this way: the prospect of being permitted to
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speak with you on occasion would be something quite important to many of the younger
colleagues there.13
Unlike Gadamer, Heidegger had neither the interest nor the health to travel to the United States,
and he never accepted any of the numerous invitations that he received to teach at American
universities. Denied Heidegger, phenomenologically-inclined Americans would have to settle for
Gadamer.
Yet the initial enthusiasm that Gadamer encountered in the United States was tempered
by a degree of indifference toward the actual landscape of German philosophical thought and
Gadamer’s place within it. Despite Gadamer’s very real philosophical differences from Husserl
and, to a lesser extent, Heidegger, early American observers initially subsumed the philosophies
of all three men—as well as the work of philosophers as eclectic as Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice
Merleau-Ponty—under the rough rubric of “phenomenology.”14 The term offered less a positive
definition of a philosophical movement than a definition-by-negation: phenomenology was any
mode of thought, especially a German one, that did not fall neatly within the tradition of AngloAmerican analytic philosophy descended from Russell and Frege. Reflecting on his early
encounters in America, Gadamer wrote, “It was no surprise to me, of course, that analytic
philosophy occupied the greatest share of the philosophical space there and what was labeled
‘continental philosophy’ was basically eclipsed by it; nor did it surprise me that for this audience
the German philosophy of our times was identified with Husserlian phenomenology and
Heidegger, and hermeneutics were little known.”15
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Amid the conceptual fuzziness of the United States, Gadamer assumed the task of forging
a distinct identity for philosophical hermeneutics within phenomenology as a whole. In the
spring of 1969, he accepted an invitation to become a visiting professor at Catholic University’s
School of Philosophy in Washington, D.C., where he arrived in March of that year. The two
courses that taught during the spring term—an undergraduate lecture course called “The
Phenomenological Movement” and a graduate seminar called “Hermeneutics and
Methodology”—reflected the precarious position that he had assumed as both a representative of
Husserlian phenomenology and a distinctively post-Husserlian phenomenologist. While
surveying the development of Husserl’s phenomenology as a whole, he focused especially on the
instabilities implicit in Husserl’s thought, which he took as a starting point for his own
hermeneutical inquiry in Truth and Method.16 In April, he wrote to Heidegger: “My renewed
Husserl studies make the tragic side of his though increasingly clear, this continual selfcomplication from which he can never quite free himself, without falling back on the simplest,
oldest motifs of his thought.”17 In Gadamer’s history of phenomenology, hermeneutics
represented the logical successor to the Husserlian tradition. Any effort to get beyond Husserl’s
shortcomings would have to pass through hermeneutics.

2.2 PALMER’S REDIRECTION: HERMENEUTICS AND LITERARY INTERPRETATION
Gadamer was initially aided in his effort to familiarize American audiences with
philosophical hermeneutics by Richard Palmer, a professor of philosophy and literature at
MacMurray College in Illinois. In 1969, concurrent with Gadamer’s second visit to America,
Palmer published Hermeneutics: Theories of Interpretation in Schleiermacher, Dilthey,
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Heidegger, and Gadamer, the first monograph on philosophical hermeneutics to appear in
English. Published six years before the first English translation of Truth and Method, Palmer’s
book both reflected a growing American interest in German hermeneutics and set the terms on
which its reception would take place. Palmer himself had first met Gadamer in 1964 as a newly
minted Ph.D. studying existentialist theology with the German theologian Gerard Ebeling in
Zurich. At the time, Palmer’s interests were purely literary. Having written his dissertation at
Redlands University on existentialism in Baudelaire, Rilke, and Eliot, Palmer had grown
dissatisfied with the reigning modes of literary criticism that were available stateside, especially
the varieties of New Criticism on offer in American literature departments. Palmer especially
objected to what he saw as the positivistic assumptions that undergirded American critical
practice. “[Contemporary criticism] presuppose[s]…that the literary work is simply ‘out there’ in
the world, essentially independent of its perceivers,” wrote Palmer in the introduction to his
book. “One’s perception of the work is considered to be separate from the work itself, and the
task of literary interpretation is to speak about the ‘work itself.’”18 By adopting this fundamental
differentiation between literary object and interpretive subject, Palmer charged, American
literary criticism had uncritically embraced the epistemology of the natural sciences: “With all its
humanistic pretensions and flamboyant defenses of poetry in the ‘age of technology,’ modern
literary criticism has itself become increasingly technological,” he wrote. “More and more, it has
imitated the approach of the scientist.”19
Palmer hoped to find in the German tradition of existentialist theological hermeneutics a
philosophical alternative to the American realist tradition that could revitalize American critical

18

Richard Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 6.
19
Palmer, Hermeneutics, 6.

63

practice. Palmer arrived in Zurich, however, unaware that Gadamer had completely upended the
very tradition that he aimed to draw from. Upon reading Palmer’s research proposal, Ebeling
handed his new student a copy of Truth and Method and directions north to Heidelberg.
“[Ebeling] suggested that my topic of hermeneutics and literary interpretation would be better
pursued starting from philosophy, with Gadamer,” Palmer wrote. 20 When he arrived in
Heidelberg in the late spring of 1965 with a letter of introduction from Ebeling, Gadamer
received him warmly. The two men quickly organized an informal discussion group with a
number of Gadamer’s students which ran throughout the summer session.
Although taken by Gadamer’s geniality and erudition, Palmer was at first frustrated in his
attempt to draw substantive connections between Gadamer’s hermeneutics and a new approach
to literary criticism. Rüdinger Bubner, one of Gadamer’s students and his future successor as the
chair of philosophy at Heidelberg, went so far as to discourage Palmer’s attempt in the first
place, suggesting that because philosophical hermeneutics shared New Criticism’s insistence on
the autonomy of the work of art, it failed to offer a meaningful vantage point from which to
criticize American criticism’s shortcomings. 21 Yet Palmer remained unconvinced. “I felt that
Rüdinger did not perceive the profound significance for literature that lay in the shift in the
deeper philosophical premises about reading and interpretation that comes from a study of
philosophical hermeneutics,” wrote Palmer. 22 His exposure to Heidegger—the two men met a
number of times over the course of the summer semester—only heightened his sense that
philosophical hermeneutics offered a fundamentally new path for literary analysis. Although
philosophical hermeneutics did insist on the autonomy of the work of art, it put that autonomy to
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a fundamentally different use than did the New Critics. Whereas for the New Critics, a work’s
autonomy allowed an interpreter to adopt a dispassionate, quasi-scientific stance toward it, for
Gadamer and Heidegger, it allowed the work to stand on its own as a disclosure of truth. By the
end of the summer, Palmer had found what he came looking for: “The summer semester of 1965
with Professor Gadamer had ushered me into a new world that exceeded my wildest
anticipations,” he wrote.23
Palmer returned to the States in the fall of 1965 and began working on the manuscript of
what would become Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey,
Heidegger, and Gadamer. Palmer intended for the work to serve a dual purpose. On the one
hand, he hoped to offer English-language readers an introduction to the historical development of
philosophical hermeneutics and an overview of contemporary debates within the field, which,
because of the absence of quality English translations of the relevant authors’ work, was
otherwise unavailable. On the other hand, he intended for the book to raise fundamental
theoretical questions about the nature of literary interpretation as preparation for a planned
second volume on hermeneutic literary practice. The structure of the book, when it appeared in
1969, conformed to these aims. Part I, “On the Definition, Scope, and Significance of
Hermeneutics,” surveyed historical and contemporary meanings of hermeneutics and glossed
ongoing debates within the field. Part II, “Four Major Theorists,” surveyed the development of
philosophical hermeneutics from Schleiermacher, through Dilthey and Heidegger, to Gadamer.
The book culminated with Part III, “A Hermeneutical Manifesto to American Literary
Interpretation,” in which Palmer drew some tentative conclusions about the significance of
philosophical hermeneutics for literary criticism.
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Yet the tripartite structure of the book had the effect of blurring the lines between
Palmer’s own philosophical interests and the broader concerns of the hermeneutical tradition that
he was nominally expounding. In a section on contemporary debates in hermeneutics, Palmer
argued that the primary fault line in contemporary hermeneutics ran between proponents of
“New Hermeneutics,” represented by Heidegger and Gadamer, and defenders of traditional
methodological hermeneutics, embodied by the Italian legal theorist Emilio Betti and taken up in
North America by the American critic E.D. Hirsch. The debate, Palmer argued, was
fundamentally one over competing definitions of hermeneutics: was hermeneutics the
methodological discipline devoted to discovering and applying rules of correct interpretation, or
was it a philosophical discipline committed to expounding the scientific structure of
understanding? For Palmer, more was at stake in this argument than simple definitions. In fact,
Palmer implied, the debate over the proper purview of hermeneutics was in reality a sort of
proxy war over the desirability of maintaining standards of interpretive objectivity, and he
presented this conflict in starkly adversarial, even militant terms: “On the one side are the
defenders of objectivity and validation, who look to hermeneutics as the theoretical source of
norms of validation; on the other side are the phenomenologists of the event of understanding,
who stress the historical character of this ‘event’ and consequently the limitations of all claims to
‘objective knowledge’ and ‘objective validity,’” wrote Palmer.24 Objectivity versus historicity:
the battles lines were drawn.
Palmer aligned himself unapologetically on the side New Hermeneutics, over and against
Betti and Hirsch. Following Gadamer, he saw the attempt to limit the scope of hermeneutical
inquiry to the narrow technical task of devising rules for proper interpretation as an abdication of
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the real hermeneutical task of explaining what all acts of understanding had in common. The old
hermeneuticists’ focus on rules and principles of validation, Palmer thought, obscured the fact
that any such set of rules or principles would itself be subject to hermeneutical scrutiny. As
Wittgenstein famously observed, there is no rule to guide the application of rules.
Yet it is questionable whether Palmer’s adversarial stance toward traditional
hermeneutics was justified by the logic of philosophical hermeneutics itself. As evidenced by the
title of Truth and Method, Gadamer went to great interpretive lengths to show that a
philosophical distinction between hermeneutic and methodological inquiry did not create an
intractable conflict between the types of truth revealed in each. For Gadamer, there was not a
genuine choice between the truth revealed by hermeneutics and the truth revealed by
methodological inquiry; truth and method had to co-exist. The major philosophical issue for
Gadamer arose not from this mere fact of separation but from the tendency of method to
monopolize all claims to truth. In Truth and Method, Gadamer in fact affirmed the limited
legitimacy of methodological approaches to literary hermeneutics, writing, “Reconstructing the
conditions in which a work passed down to us from the past was originally constituted is
undoubtedly an important aid to understanding it,” though he affirmed, with Hegel, that such an
activity was “external” (i.e. non-essential) to the authentic act of understanding. 25
On this basis, Gadamer was able to distinguish his own hermeneutics from Betti’s
without impugning the value or intellectual coherence of either. In the foreword to the second
edition of Truth and Method, Gadamer explicitly differentiated the purposes of these two
approaches to hermeneutics, writing “[T]he purpose of my investigation is not to offer methods
(which Emilio Betti has done so well) but to discover what is common to all modes of
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understanding and to show that understanding is never a subjective relation to a given ‘object’
but to the history of its effect.”26 When Gadamer did raise substantive disagreements with Betti,
his objections were exclusively over the possibility of distinguishing normative, philological, and
historical hermeneutics based on the degree of application operative in each. 27 Nor could Hirsch
substitute as a more productive debate partner. In Truth and Interpretation, published six years
after Truth and Method in 1967, Hirsch did respond directly to Gadamer by arguing that
Gadamer’s hermeneutics opened the door to interpretive subjectivism. But because of the timing
of its publication, Gadamer himself had not had an opportunity to respond to Truth and
Interpretation when Palmer’s book appeared. If there was a genuine debate between Gadamer
and Hirsch over the standard of interpretive objectivity, it was not one that Gadamer himself had
seriously engaged in.
Yet Palmer’s book suffered from a more fundamental flaw. By presenting the debate
between new and old hermeneutics as a showdown between the defenders and critics of
interpretive objectivity, Palmer implicitly conceded the terms of the debate to Betti and Hirsch.
For Gadamer, hermeneutics critically involved the effort to move beyond the simple distinction
between objectivism and subjectivism, to show that all acts of understanding involve a
coordination between text and reader that could not faithfully be described with the vocabulary
of the empirical or rationalist sciences. Yet by positioning himself and Gadamer as the opponents
of objectivism, Palmer unwittingly fell back on the distinction that Gadamer had tried to blow
open. In Palmer’s presentation, hermeneutics was never allowed to fight on its own turf.
Nevertheless, reviewers of Palmer’s book adopted his battle lines and, more often than
not, positioned themselves on the opposing side. Critics were particularly quick to criticize
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Gadamer’s alleged failure to delineate a principle of interpretive verification, arguing, with
Palmer’s imagined opponents, that Gadamer’s explication of the historicity of understanding
opened the path to willy-nilly interpretive laxity. “The question…is whether Gadamer’s mode of
philosophical inquiry leaves room for any logic of validation at all,” wrote Rudolf Makkreel in
the Journal of the History of Philosophy. “Having adopted Gadamer’s theory, [Palmer] should
not ignore the fact that Warheit und Methode was aimed at exposing method as the corrupter of
understanding, and that this entails the rejection of method both as a means of discovering
meaning and as a means of validating discovered meaning.” 28 Critics also replicated Palmer’s
contention that Gadamer stood against Betti and Hirsch as the opponent of interpretive
objectivism. Daniel Noel, writing in The Western Humanities Review, wrote:
Both Betti and Hirsch reach back to Dilthey in reaffirming a methodological orientation,
and Hirsch is especially anxious to find a hermeneutics which will provide objective
norms for distinguishing false from correct interpretation. Palmer denies the possibility of
such validation, citing Rudolf Bultmann, one of Gadamer’s theological allies, to the
effect that ‘objective meaning in history cannot be spoken of, for history cannot be
known except through the subjectivity of the historical himself.’ 29
Reviewing Palmer’s book for Foundations of Language, the American poet Leonard Nathan cast
aspersion on the entire hermeneutic project, writing, “Heideggerian interpretation would dig out
the ‘hidden’ meaning [of texts]. But that sort of practice seems to lead, if not to bad philosophy,
[to] gross misreadings of poetry as a sort of expression of the higher mystery to which only
certain philosophers are entitled to minister. The word for that, I’m afraid, is romanticism.”30
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It is revealing of the early trajectory of the debate over hermeneutics in America that the
only critic of Palmer’s book to notice divergences between Palmer’s presentation of Gadamer’s
work and Gadamer’s work itself was a British philosopher, A.G. Pleydell-Pearce. In his review
of the book for the Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology, Pleydell-Pearce wrote,
“According to the author, Betti’s emphasis on the autonomy of the object puts him squarely into
the realist camp and hence in opposition to the phenomenological…Although the author insists
that the two positions are not totally antithetical, we are increasingly asked to choose between
them.”31 Unlike his American counterparts, Pleydell-Pearce recognized that Palmer presented a
false choice: “Even if we admit, as I think we must and as the author does, that understanding is
an historical event, that ultimately we understand any work as it appears to us in our historical
present, it is not clear that Betti’s claim that we should attempt to ‘discover what is embodied in
the work’ should be rejected.”32
Palmer affected a second re-direction in the burgeoning American debate over
philosophical hermeneutics by linking Gadamer’s ideas directly to debates about literary
criticism. As Palmer wrote in the introduction to his book, the aim of his volume was
fundamentally practical: to re-open the philosophical question of interpretation in the service of a
more adequate and philosophically astute method of literary interpretation. It was toward this
goal that Palmer devoted the entire third section of his book, “A Hermeneutical Manifesto to
American Literary Interpretation,” which included both a philosophical reflection on the nature
of interpretation and a list of thirty short “theses” on literary interpretation. The purpose of this
final section, Palmer wrote, was “[t]o clarify the critique of prevailing conceptions of literary
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interpretation which is implicit in phenomenological hermeneutics, and to set forth in a
preliminary way the character of a theory of literary interpretation based on it.” 33
Yet here, too, Palmer directed Gadamer’s philosophy toward a different goal than the one
that Gadamer himself set for it. Certainly Gadamer’s hermeneutics provided a novel way of
thematizing the philosophical problems at stake in literary interpretation, but Palmer attempted to
deduce from this new approach an original form of interpretive praxis. Gadamer, by contrast, had
explicitly declined to take this step. “The hermeneutics developed here is not…a methodology of
the human sciences, but an attempt to understand what the human sciences truly are, beyond
their methodological self-consciousness, and what connects them with that totality of our
experience of the world,” wrote Gadamer in the preface to Truth and Method.34 “If there is any
practical consequence of the present investigation, it certainly has nothing to do with an
unscientific ‘commitment’; instead, it is concerned with the ‘scientific’ integrity of
acknowledging the commitment involved in all understanding.” 35 Philosophical completeness,
not practical benefit, was the standard by which Gadamer hoped his project would be judged.
Indeed, the very concept of “hermeneutical literary criticism,” would likely have struck Gadamer
as redundant, if not completely dissonant. What literary criticism was not always already
hermeneutical?
Yet critics did not fail to judge philosophical hermeneutics by the standard that Palmer,
rather than Gadamer, had set for it. “The book ends before it begins if it proposes to show us
how concretely to interpret, how to read and hear right,” Nathan wrote. “Professor Palmer, like
Heidegger, proffers no evidence that hermeneutics offers an effective new approach to
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interpretation. His book which is part exposition, part polemic, does not fulfill the promise to
provide American critics with some significant revelation.” 36 Noel echoed Nathan’s criticism,
writing, “Although the third part of the present work comprises ‘A Hermeneutical Manifesto to
American Literary Interpretation,’ which contains thirty theses designed to prod literary scholars
beyond New Criticism and out of their hermeneutical naïveté, for a detailed theory of literary
interpretation based on phenomenological hermeneutics we must await a promised second
book.”37 Even a sympathetic reviewer like Pleydell-Pearce found Palmer’s book wanting in
practical import: “There are mystical and instinctivist overtones in [Palmer’s] claim; a claim
which, in addition to rendering any discussion of a particular work impossible, tends toward the
uncritical acceptance of whatever the literary text ‘discloses’ to the particular reader,” PleydellPearce wrote. “If this is a consequence of the thesis it is unlikely to commend itself to those
concerned with literary interpretation, whether American or of any other nationality.”38
Despite these apparent divergences between Palmer’s presentation of Gadamer’s
hermeneutics and Gadamer’s own aims in Truth and Method, Gadamer did not directly join the
debate about Palmer’s book. Almost twenty years later, in 1991, Gadamer belatedly thanked
Palmer for the book at a dinner in Heidelberg: “[My] book made it possible, he said, for him to
convey to Americans on his visit something of what his philosophy was about,” said Palmer,
recounting the exchange.39 Nevertheless, Palmer’s book gave philosophical hermeneutics an
inauspicious introduction to American readers, who were not aided by Palmer’s failure to
produce his promised second volume on hermeneutic interpretive practice. It would be a mistake,
however, to label Palmer’s project a complete failure. By providing a rejoinder to Hirsch’s
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rejection of hermeneutics, Palmer ensured that Gadamer’s ideas would remain a live subject of
debate in American literary, preparing the ground, as it were, for Gadamer’s own involvement in
these debates across the next two decades. More importantly, Palmer’s presentation of
Gadamer’s work raised important questions about the nature of reception itself. It is true that
Palmer brought Gadamer’s ideas to bear on debates that Gadamer himself had not considered,
but did that fact render his application of these ideas invalid? If, as Gadamer himself argued, the
meaning of a text always “goes beyond” the meaning that its offer held for it, in what respect can
Palmer be said to have misinterpreted Gadamer’s work, rather than merely realized a new
potential of its application? Can we speak about a genuine interpretive dead end, or only an
interpretive redirection? Insofar as Palmer’s work served as a touchstone for this debate, it was
not a failure at all.
That said, Palmer did fail in his more immediate task of producing a second volume on
hermeneutics critical practice. He later wrote that his work on this follow-up volume stalled not
because such a practice was impossible but because a new and unexpected force had overtaken
New Criticism as the major force in American literary criticism: the curious blend of French
structuralism and Anglo-American Romanticism that became known as “literary theory.”40 By
the time Palmer returned to Heidelberg for a second visit in 1971, he had recognized that
philosophical hermeneutics would have to address itself to this new force, not New Criticism, if
it wanted to carve out space in American literary circles. “I spent my grant in Heidelberg
listening to Gadamer’s lectures…but I also spend time probing the writings of Nietzsche,
Foucault, and Derrida,” he wrote. “Exploring this French connection became a prerequisite for
that second book, but it was never written.” 41 In this latter respect at least, Palmer was
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completely correct. Although he had failed to affect a serious hermeneutical reevaluation within
New Criticism, he had succeeded in establishing hermeneutics as a live subject in American
literary criticism more broadly. And this meant that, sooner or later, hermeneutics would have to
meet the challenge of literary theory.

2.3 PUTTING TRUTH TO WORK: HERMENEUTICS AND LITERARY THEORY
Gadamer returned to Heidelberg in the summer of 1969 to continue work on his book on
Plato, which consumed his time for the remainder of that year and through the next. Back in the
States, “literary theory,” as observers increasingly called it, was roiling American departments of
comparative literature. The wave of criticism, which had been gathering speed through the
1960s, broke suddenly at the end of the decade. In 1970, Derrida’s address from the famous 1966
conference at Johns Hopkins appeared in English under the title, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the
Discourse of the Human Sciences.” By 1971, the so-called “Hermeneutical Mafia” of Paul de
Man, Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman, and J. Hallis Miller had assembled at Yale, which
quickly became the indisputable epicenter of American theory. The rapid ascendency of literary
theory created a sense of crisis and disorientation within the American academy. “No set of
arguments, no enumeration of symptoms will ever prove the present effervescence surrounding
literary criticism is in fact a crisis that, for better or worse, is reshaping the critical consciousness
of a generation,” wrote de Man in Blindness and Insight, his first major published work, which
appeared in 1971. “It remains relevant, however, that these people are experiencing it as a crisis
and that they are constantly using the language of crisis in referring to what is taking place.”42
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It was, perhaps, a crisis in miniature, taking place as it did mostly within Yale’s fortified
campus and in the minds of scholars who paid attention to the happenings in New Haven.
Moreover, the extent to which the “Yale quartet” can accurately be grouped together as a
cohesive school of thought remains a subject of debate. Each of the four scholars at various
points affirmed his affinity with the others and caustically registered their disagreements, both
personal and intellectual.43 Despite these real differences––and an admittedly insular focus––
literary theory represented an undeniably enticing development in American literary thought. de
Man, Bloom, Hartman, and Miller all shared a broad interest in the philosophical status of
language and literary speech, especially with the ways that literary language, as a system of
signs, could conceal, distort, or disguise meaning. “The trend in Continental criticism, whether it
derives its language from sociology, psychoanalysis, ethnology, linguistics, or even from certain
forms of philosophy, can be quickly summarized,” de Man wrote in Blindness and Insight. “[I]t
represents a methodologically motivated attack on the notion that a literary or poetic
consciousness is in any way a privileged consciousness, whose use of language can pretend to
escape, to some degree, the duplicity, the confusion, the untruth that we take for granted in
everyday uses of language.”44
This linguistic insight cut to the core of literature’s self-identity. If literature could no
longer take for granted its cherished mimetic function––its ability, through the convergence of
sign and signifier, to represent linguistically some non-linguistic reality—then what ground did it
stand on? For the literary theorists, this critical reevaluation opened up an entirely new range of
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possibilities for literature. Unlike ordinary, everyday speech, literary speech could do more than
represent the world; it could construct a totally new one. “All literatures…have always
designated themselves as existing in the mode of fiction,” de Mann wrote. “The self-reflective
mirror-effect by means of which a work of fiction asserts, by its very existence, its separation
from empirical reality, its divergence, as a sign, from a meaning that depends for its existence on
the constituting activity of this sign, characterizes literature in its essence.” 45 In this respect,
literary speech stood forth as the paradigmatic use of speech, the construction of a system of
signs that could hold forth a claim to be real despite its foundationlessness in reality. It was
language liberated from its merely representation function, a type of pure, unencumbered
discourse.
For de Man, this linguistic fact concealed a humanistic insight: that the human subject,
like literature, required construction. Literature became an expression of the fictiveness that
characterized the “ontological status of the self.” “[In fiction] the human self has experienced the
void within itself and the invented fiction, far from filling the void, asserts itself as pure
nothingness, our nothingness stated and restated by a subject that is the agent of its own
instability,” de Man wrote.46 In this respect, literature represented the purest form of philosophy:
“From this point on, philosophical anthropology would be inconceivable without the
consideration of literature as a primary source of knowledge,” de Man concluded. 47 In the final
reckoning, all was fiction, or else it was nothing.
It was into this crisis of literary consciousnesses that Gadamer returned to the United
States in the spring of 1971 to fill a one-semester appointment at Syracuse University. At this
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point, an encounter between hermeneutics and American literary theory was all but inevitable.
But that this encounter would take place on de Man’s turf—both geographical and
philosophical—was hardly predetermined. de Man had referred to Gadamer’s work in Truth and
Method at three other points in Blindness and Insight: once to Gadamer’s discussion of symbol
and allegory in his section on aesthetics, and twice to Gadamer’s analysis of the historicity of
understanding and the structure of the hermeneutic circle. Yet in March of that year, when
Gadamer traveled to Canada for the first time to deliver a series of lectures at the University of
Toronto, he chose to speak about poetics, de Man’s area of expertise.
Of course, Gadamer was himself no lightweight in the field of philosophical poetics,
having devoted the entire third section of Truth and Method to developing a hermeneutical
theory of language. And it didn’t take him long to position his remarks, which he provocatively
titled “On the Truth of the Word,” vis-à-vis de Man’s position. “One hears such expressions
today as ‘deception by language’ and the suspicion of ideology and metaphysics, so when I now
propose to speak about ‘the truth of the word’ it amounts to a provocation!” said Gadamer in the
very first line of his remarks.48 Despite this initial jab, Gadamer agreed with de Man on a number
of critical points. Like de Man and the Yale critics, Gadamer recognized that the toppling of the
representational paradigm of language marked a seismic event in the history of poetics. Yet
whereas the Yale critics explored the possibilities that the negation of language’s representation
ability had opened up, it was language’s ability to perform functions beyond simple
representation that interested Gadamer. Citing J.L. Austin’s theory that words “do things,”
Gadamer asked what it meant for language to be “true” in its non-representational sense. In this
respect, the basic unit of language, Gadamer argued, was not the single word or even the
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sentenced combined into a discourse, but rather what Gadamer called the “statement” (Aussage),
understood as any sort of expressive phenomenon—a text, a painting, a poem—in its entirety.
When expanded to include the entire statement of a work of art, the truth of the word
could obviously no longer be determined by its representational validity. “It seems evident from
the outset that the word that is able to address us cannot be characterized just in terms of the
content to which it refers,” Gadamer wrote. “The same is true of the visual arts and for the same
reason. Someone who looks at the objective content of a painting often looks right past what
makes it a work of art.”49 Rather, Gadamer argued, the word is true when it captures being in its
movement and discloses it to other beings. “The universal ‘there’ of being in the word is the
miracle of language, and the highest possibility of saying consists in binding its passing away
and escape and in making firm the nearness to being,” Gadamer wrote. “It fulfills itself within
itself, because it is a ‘holding of the near,’ and it becomes an empty word when it is reduced to
its signifying function.”50 For Gadamer, the true word temporarily arrested being in its flux and
drew the observer in to it: “The truth of the artwork is not the speaking forth of the logos, but is
rather a ‘that it is’ and a ‘there’ at the same time, that stand in the strife of disclosure and
sheltering concealment.”51 The word provided a window onto being in all its movement, fullness
and historicity. It did not represent so much as it revealed.
Gadamer drew two conclusions about literary criticism from his analysis of word as
Aussage. First, if the truth of language arose from its ability to disclose being, then poetic
speech—the type of speech that “founds meaning,” as Gadamer put it—could displace “normal
speech”—the type of speech that represents states of affairs—as the paradigmatic use of
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language. “What language as language is, and what we here seek as the ‘truth of the word,’
cannot be grasped by taking the so-called ‘normal’ forms of linguistic communication as the
starting point; on the contrary, the possibilities of such forms of communication are better
grasped by starting from the poetical manner of speaking,” wrote Gadamer. “The self-fulfillment
of the poetic word makes it clear why language can be merely a means of conveying
information, but a mere means of conveying information cannot become a language.” 52 Second,
by uncoupling the truth of an assertion from its representational value, Gadamer simultaneously
uncoupled the truth of an interpretation from its correspondence with the psychological state of
its author. “One hopelessly mistakes what literature is when one tries to go from the literary
construction back to the psychological act of intending it, to which the author gave ‘expression,’”
Gadamer wrote. “Every construing of a text is preceded by an understanding of it, and whoever
fears for the objectivity of interpretation because of this had better ask whether tracking the
meaning of a literary text back to an opinion of its original created expressed in a text does not
destroy the artistic meaning of literature as such.” 53 Here, Gadamer’s engagement with the new
poetics had allowed him to deepen the critique of Romantic hermeneutics that he had begun in
Truth and Method. The attempt to discover the meaning of a text by recovering the psychological
state of its author is misguided not only because an interpreter stands at an unbridgeable
historical distance from the author, but also because it misconstrues the essential function of
language. If language’s most basic function is to disclose being, rather than to represent some
non-linguistic reality, then discovering the psychological condition of an author—what he
intended his words to represent—is completely incidental to grasping the truth of a text.
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The contrasts between de Man’s and Gadamer’s understandings of poetic language were
made all the more striking by the pair’s numerous and very real points of agreements. Both took
the separation of the sign from the signifier as the starting point of their investigations; both
deduced from this separation the exemplary nature of literary-poetic language; both criticized
Romanticism’s emphasis on mimetic representation. Yet in their final evaluations, de Man and
Gadamer diverged drastically. For de Man, the enduring power of literature lay in its ability to
reveal the fictiveness and nothingness that the self conceals. For Gadamer, literature “put truth to
work” when it captured being and disclosed it across space and time. Where de Mann saw
instability, Gadamer found stability; deMan, nothingness; Gadamer, being.
Gadamer’s initial foray into American poetics marked the opening salvo of the exchange
between hermeneutics and literary theory that would culminate, almost exactly ten years later,
with the much-anticipated encounter between Gadamer and Derrida at the Goethe Institute in
Paris in April of 1981. As Palmer has argued in his useful collection on the encounter, this socalled “exchange” between the two men was in fact a prime example of the failure of the
Gadamerian ideal of dialogue, as Derrida refused to engage Gadamer’s questions and Gadamer
struggled to make sense of the Frenchman’s oblique conversation style.54
In the American context, however, the important outcome of Gadamer’s early encounter
with theory was that it positioned philosophical hermeneutics as a less radical alternative to
deconstruction. In his essay “Reading and History,” published in 1982, de Man praised the work
of Hans Robert Jauss, one of Gadamer’s most prolific students, while simultaneously suggesting
that hermeneutics remained a subspecies of the very same metaphysics of presence that literary
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theory tried to deconstruct.55 “Hermeneutics is, by definition, a process directed toward the
determination of meaning; it postulates a transcendental functioning of understanding, no matter
how complex, deferred, or tenuous it might be, and will, in however mediated a way, have to
raise questions about the extralinguistic truth value of literary texts,” wrote de Man. “In a
hermeneutic enterprise, reading necessarily intervenes but, like computation in algebraic proof, it
is a means toward an end, a means that should finally become transparent and superfluous.”56
Hermeneutics’ transcendental orientation, in de Man’s account, made it a useful though
essentially conservative force in American literary criticism. “The question remains to be
considered,” wrote de Man, “whether Jauss’s [and Gadamer’s] own historical procedure can
indeed claim to free itself from the coercion of a model”—i.e., metaphysics— “that is perhaps
more powerful, and for less controllable reasons, that its assumed opponents believe.” 57
Yet de Man’s Resistance to Theory also manifested a decidedly hermeneutic turn.
Despite his criticisms, de Man found significant common ground with Jauss’s aesthetics of
reception. In particular, de Man saw in post-Heideggerian hermeneutics the possibility of
acknowledging the solidity of meaning that readers discover in literary texts without slipping
into naïve metaphysicalizing about language and meaning. “In the final analysis, [hermeneutics]
provides a model for the articulation between structure and interpretation…Attributes of
difference and similarity can be exchanged thanks to the intervention of temporal categories,”
wrote de Man. “By allowing the work to exist in time without complete loss of identity, the
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alienation of its formal structure is suspended by the history of it its understanding.”58 In other
words, hermeneutics allowed a critic to trace the emergence of meaning in a text without reifying
meaning itself into a timeless or transcendent entity. Gadamer’s being and de Man’s nothingness
could co-exist within works of literature, mediated by the history of their reception and
interpretation.
Gadamer, too, found the encounter with American literary theory instructive, and he later
recalled being received warmly by American departments of literature. “Certainly it is
everywhere evident that the great inheritance of Greek and Christian thinking in our age of
science is not to be found only in departments of philosophy…Thus, in my visits to America I
could connect not only with theology but also with departments related to language and
literature, especially comparative literature, departments which in the German language we
sometimes refer to as the ‘philological disciplines,’” wrote Gadamer. 59 Philosophically, his
encounter with literary theory directed his thinking about the Platonic dialogues, the subject of
his ongoing research at the time, back to the question of textuality. For Gadamer, the dialogic
structure of Plato’s texts had long served as his model of ideal philosophical discourse; that they
were also texts was only of secondary interest. But after his encounter with literary theory,
Gadamer could not evade the fact that the dialogues that he so championed were essentially and
inescapably texts:
[The Platonic dialogues], of course, immediately confront us with the fundamental
hermeneutic problem of writtenness [Schriftlichkeit]. Plato’s dialogues are conversations
written down by a great philosophical and poetic master, and yet we know from Plato
himself…that [Socrates] did not leave behind a written presentation of his true teaching
and did not want to. This means he has unequivocally confronted us with the necessity of
a mimetic doubling, that is to say, by means of the written conversation to go back to the
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originally spoken conversation in which the thought found words—a task that can never
be fully accomplished. 60
As literary texts, the dialogues manifested all the semiotic distortions and obfuscations that
theory had identified in all uses of language. Faced with this fact, Gadamer acknowledged the
legitimacy of the deconstructionist enterprise, if only in a limited sense. “The word ‘Destruktion’
in Heidegger traverses all the layers of [a text’s] heritage, and it does so not in order to destroy
something but to set something free,” Gadamer wrote.61 Even the most dialogical of philosophers
had to reckon with the fact that all philosophy eventually ossifies into text, or else slowly slips
into the void of historical oblivion.
Thus three years after Gadamer’s arrived in the United States, philosophical hermeneutics
remained in a precarious position. On the one hand, hermeneutics appeared to some literary
critics as a radical intellectual force, bent on undermining standards of interpretive objectivity
and destroying the firm ground of interpretive praxis. To others, it seemed to be a reactionary
philosophical movement, determined to preserve the integrity of tradition and defend a
metaphysics of meaning in the face of more radical challenges from post-structuralist linguistics
and literary theory. Underlying this debate about literary criticism, however, was a thinly
disguised argument about the broader political implications of philosophical hermeneutics. Did
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, with its emphasis on the determining role of tradition, legitimize
existing modes of intellectual and social discourse, or did its insistence on the open-endedness of
philosophical discourse create possibilities for radical re-imaginings of these discourses and the
institutions that generated them? At the center of this debate was the difficult relationship
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between hermeneutics and the social sciences: what, if anything, did philosophical hermeneutics
have to say about existing political and social realities? What were the politics of hermeneutics?
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Chapter Three
GADAMER’S ENCOUNTERS: PART TWO
After another spring in Heidelberg, Gadamer returned to North America in the winter of
1971 to serve as a visiting professor at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. A mid-tier
public research university known for its science and engineering programs, McMaster had
become a hotbed of philosophical research after the university secured the much-coveted archive
and personal library of Bertrand Russel in 1968. By all accounts, Gadamer enjoyed a leisurely if
somewhat unproductive stay at McMaster, where he would return to teach for the next two fall
semesters. In 1973, he developed a serious circulatory illness and, believing he was about to die,
sold his entire personal library to the university. 1 Yet his health soon returned, and he was able to
resume his teaching and research duties that fall. Writing after Gadamer’s death, Gary Madison,
a professor of philosophy at McMaster, remembered long afternoon walks with Gadamer in
Hamilton’s Royal Botanic Gardens and extended discussions over beers in the faculty club.
“This, of course, is precisely the way Gadamer intended it, devoted as he was to the spirit of
dialogue and to being of assistance, through dialogue, to young professors like me,” Madison
wrote. “It was in these conversations that I truly learned what Gadamer’s ‘philosophy’ was all
about.”2

3.1 TOWARD A HERMENEUTIC SOCIAL SCIENCE
Yet Gadamer’s tenure in Canada was not all strolls and beer. While teaching at
McMaster, he increasingly turned his thinking to the relationship between philosophy and social
life, and more specifically, to the nexus of philosophical hermeneutics and the social sciences.
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The impetus for this new focus had been a series of exchanges that Gadamer had had with the
German critical theorist Jürgen Habermas. Gadamer and Habermas were good friends and, for
three years, colleagues at Heidelberg, where Habermas joined the philosophy faculty in 1962 at
Gadamer’s request. 3 Habermas had arrived at Heidelberg under somewhat tumultuous
circumstances, having been forced to complete his Habilitation thesis at the University of
Marburg after Max Horkheimer, Habermas’s advisor at Frankfurt, blocked his thesis work, over
the objection of Theodore Adorno. After reading a late draft of Habermas’s still-unfinished
Habilitation, Gadamer invited the 33-year-old scholar to join the philosophy faculty at
Heidelberg—a highly irregular appointment, given that Habermas had yet to complete his
Habilitation.
Almost thirty years Habermas’s senior, Gadamer became a scholarly mentor for
Habermas after his unceremonious departure from Frankfurt. According to Grondin, the two men
developed an unusually close professional relationship at Heidelberg, often sharing ideas and
recommending each other’s work and courses to their students.4 Yet despite their close personal
and intellectual partnership, Habermas retained a robust set of independent interests. By training,
Habermas was a sociologist in the tradition of Weber and Marx, a stark contrast to Gadamer’s
training as a classical philologist. Politically, he was an outspoken supporter of the German left,
which had rallied around the failure of the older generation—Gadamer’s generation—to combat
the rise of Nazism. Intellectually, he had adopted Marx’s and the Frankfurt School’s antipathy to
German idealism, the remnants of which he detected in neo-Kantianism and, to a degree, in
Heidegger’s existential ontology.
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As the heir to Heidegger’s ontology, Gadamer would soon find himself in Habermas’s
intellectual crosshairs. In 1967, having returned to Frankfurt at Adorno’s urging, Habermas
published his first extended critique of philosophical hermeneutics in his second major published
work, On the Logic of the Social Sciences. The purpose of the book, Habermas wrote in the
introduction, was to reopen the philosophical debate between the natural and historical sciences
in order to overcome the philosophical dualism that continued to bedevil the discipline. Unlike
the natural sciences or the tradition Geisteswissenchaften, the social sciences, Habermas argued,
could not simply choose between a positivist and hermeneutic theory of social action; a
comprehensive account of social life required some sort of synthesis of the two. “Whereas the
natural and the cultural or hermeneutic sciences are capable of living in a mutually indifferent,
albeit more hostile than peaceful, coexistence, the social science must bear the tension of
divergent approaches under one roof, for in them the very practice of research compels reflection
on the relationship between analytic and hermeneutic methodologies,” Habermas wrote. 5
In some respects, Habermas’ book marked a significant advance for hermeneutics within
the philosophy of the social sciences as a whole. At the time of Habermas’s writing,
hermeneutics remained the insurgent philosophical force within the field, which was otherwise
dominated by the influence of Popperian positivism. That a rising star of critical sociology had
made a serious attempt to integrate the logic of the historical-hermeneutic sciences alongside the
logic of positivism into a unified logic of the social sciences showed that the philosophical winds
within the discipline were shifting. Yet Habermas remained critical of the more totalizing
elements of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. He was especially suspicious of what he saw as the onesidedness of Gadamer’s thematization of the efficacy of tradition and the comparatively modest

5

Jürgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. Sherry Weber Nicholsen, Jerry A. Stark (Cambridge:
The MIT Press, 1991), 3.

87

role that Gadamer assigned to historical reflection. For Habermas, historical reflection was
fundamentally an emancipatory activity: in the process of uncovering the historical character of
contemporary ways of thinking and being, he argued, individuals and societies could free
themselves from the coercive and repressive elements of these discourses and begin to construct
freer, less coercive systems. Gadamer, by contrast, was less sanguine about the emancipatory
possibilities of historical reflection. In his reckoning, the actual effects of being in history always
outstripped historical reflection’s ability to come to terms with that same historicality. Reflection
might lead to a limited self-awareness, but it could never get beyond the horizon of prejudices
that everywhere circumscribed finite human life. The social sciences were not immune from the
hermeneutic conditions that defined all interpretive activities.
Yet in Habermas’s view, Gadamer had misunderstood the function of the social sciences
by ignoring the emancipatory effect of historical reflection. In his chapter on Gadamer in The
Logic of the Social Sciences, entitled “The Hermeneutic Approach,” Habermas wrote, “Gadamer
fails to recognize the power of reflection that unfolds in Versehen [understanding]. There
reflection is no longer blinded by the illusion of an absolute, self-grounded autonomy, and it
does not detach itself from the ground of the contingent on which it finds itself. But when
reflection understands the genesis of the tradition from which it proceeds and to which it turns,
the dogmatism of life-praxis is shaken.”6 To live naively within a tradition with no awareness of
the tradition qua tradition, he argued, represented a phenomenologically different experience
than living in a tradition that historical reflection has revealed as a tradition. Gadamer’s
insistence that historical reflection affected little to no meaningful change in the
phenomenological condition of a historical agent seemed to foreclose on the possibility that an
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agent could, by identifying the historical origins and development of a coercive or illegitimate
authority, begin to liberate himself from its control. In Habermas’s view, Gadamer’s
hermeneutics absolutized the power and authority of tradition, turning it into an ontological
prison that, no matter how coercive or repressive, offered no possibility of escape.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Habermas’s philosophical critique of hermeneutics involved a
dimension of political disagreement. For Habermas, Gadamer’s failure to recognize the
emancipatory potential of historical reflection made his hermeneutics a conservative, even
reactionary political force. “In his conviction that true authority need not be authoritarian,
Gadamer is motivated by the conservatism of the first generation, by the impulse of Burke not
yet directed against the rationalism of the eighteenth century,” Habermas wrote. “True authority,
according to Gadamer, distinguishes itself from false authority through being acknowledged:
‘indeed, authority has nothing to do with obedience, but rather with knowledge.’ This very harsh
sentence expresses a fundamental philosophical conviction that coincides not so much with
hermeneutics as with its absolutization.” 7 In Gadamer’s insistence that the hermeneutic situation
remained a universal condition of language, Habermas detected a rigid, even authoritarian
inclination; in his argument that all understanding was fore-shaped by tradition, Habermas saw
an attempt to legitimize existing social conditions. Whereas Gadamer wanted to model
hermeneutics on the relationship between the dutiful student and the beloved mentor, Habermas
thought hermeneutics behaved like the ideal Nietzschean student, who knows that the only way
to honor a teacher is to move beyond him.
By the early 1970s, the reverberations of the Gadamer-Habermas debate were beginning
to cause tremors in North America. In 1971, the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor published

7

Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, 169.

89

an essay in the Review of Metaphysics advocating for a more hermeneutical approach to social
scientific research, citing Gadamer as his chief influence. Taylor, who was deeply engaged with
both Marxism and post-Heideggerian phenomenology, was particularly well-positioned to
inaugurate this debate in North America. While earning his DPhil at Oxford University under
Isaiah Berlin in the late-1950s, Taylor had become an active member of the New Left at the very
moment when the movement was trying to forge a “third way” for Marxism between Stalinist
authoritarianism and western-style liberalism. Sympathetic to Marx’s project yet deeply
influenced by the English Romantics, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, Taylor had worked to
advance a more humane and humanistic interpretation of Marxist social science that avoided the
cruder elements of Marx’s naturalism and reductionism without slipping into unrestrained
idealism.8 After completing his thesis at Oxford—a critique of psychological behaviorism—
Taylor returned to North America to teach at McGill University in Ontario, where he began work
on a colossal, 600-page volume on Gadamer’s other philosophical lodestar, Hegel.
Like de Man’s critique of literary interpretation, Taylor’s turn toward a more hermeneutic
social science was critically informed by a sense of impending crisis—in Taylor’s case, his
intuition that the actual developments of social reality were outstripping the methodological
framework that the social sciences had adopted to explain them. As an active member of the
New Left, Taylor was particularly concerned with explaining how a period of rising material
affluence and political stability in the West had given rise to the widespread social discontent
and political alienation of the late 1960s. “The strains in contemporary society, the breakdown of
civility, the rise of deep alienation, which is translated into even more destructive action, tend to
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shake the basic categories of our social science,” wrote Taylor in his 1971 essay. “It is not just
that such a development was quite unpredicted by this science…It is rather that this mainstream
science hasn’t the categories to explain this breakdown.”9 For Taylor, the social and political
crises of the 1960s and ’70s were inextricably bound up with crises of social meaning. If the
social sciences hoped to explain the former, they had to be able to take account of the later.
But, Taylor argued, the self-understanding of the positivist social sciences prevented
them from taking serious account of human meaning. Committed to investigating only those
areas of human life that could be verified empirically or logically, the social sciences had
sidestepped any and all questions that involved problems of interpretation—first and foremost
questions about meaningful human action. “Any description of reality in terms of meaning which
is open to interpretive question is only allowed into this scientific discourse if it is placed, as it
were, in quotes and attributed to individuals as their opinions, belief, attitude,” Taylor wrote.
“…But what it in fact cannot allow for are intersubjective meanings, that is, it cannot allow for
the validity of descriptions of social reality in terms of meanings, hence not as brutal data, which
are not in quotation marks and attributed as opinion, attitudes, etc., to individual(s).”10 The social
sciences could determine, for example, that subjects who hold a certain political belief—say, that
political equality is of more fundamental importance to American democracy than political
freedom—were more likely to perform a given political action—say, registering as a member of
the Democratic Party—but they refused to investigate the intersubjective web of significance that
made sense of this political action as a meaningful expression of that individual’s political belief.
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Such a determination, Taylor argued, would require a set of interpretive principles that did not fit
neatly into positivism’s model of verification and induction, and therefore seemed suspect.
Taylor recognized that this search for a truly interpretive “science of man” would require
certain concessions from the social sciences which, from within their native epistemology, would
appear impermissible. On the one hand, the social sciences would have to surrender their
principle of verification based on an appeal to brute empirical data in favor of a principle of
verification based on hermeneutical insight, i.e. on readings of social discourses that make better
sense of their meaning from within a hermeneutic circle of other, related readings. This would
mean that some disputes about social life would ultimately be non-arbitrable except by appeal to
broader and deeper insights, which in turn would always be open to interpretive dispute. The
social sciences, in other words, would have to make their peace with operating within the
hermeneutic circle.
Moreover, the social sciences would have to surrender their claim to any predictive
power. Unlike the value-neutral vocabulary of the natural sciences, the conceptual framework of
the human sciences could not claim to offer undistorted accounts of human meaning across time
and space. “Really to be able to predict the future would be to have [explicated] so clearly the
human condition that one would already have pre-emptied all cultural innovation and
transformation,” wrote Taylor. “This is hardly in the bounds of the possible.” 11 Thus the purview
of a genuinely hermeneutical social science, as Taylor conceived of it, would be restricted to ex
post facto explanation of cultural change. A hermeneutic social science could lead to greater
degrees of self-knowledge and self-clarity, but it would have little to contribute in the way
revolutionary or prophetic visions of social development.
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At the same time as Taylor was inaugurating these debates in North America, Gadamer
was beginning to formulate his own hermeneutical diagnosis of the social and political ills that
he was witnessing in Europe and the United States. In 1973, Gadamer published an essay, “On
Man’s Natural Inclination Towards Philosophy,” in which he expressed special concern with the
ever-creeping influence of technological methods of social control and the concomitant
marginalization of non-scientific modes of thought. More than ever before, Gadamer argued,
scientific rationality claimed to hold the solutions to all of humankind’s problem—social,
political, economic, biological, psychological, and historical. “[There is] a growing expectation
as to the ability of science ultimately to banish all unpredictable factors from the inner moral life
of society by subjecting all spheres of life to scientific control,” wrote Gadamer. “…And this
again leads to the demand for scientific planning and for a science whose subject matter is the
future.”12 Faced with the self-professed explanatory prowess of the social sciences, the
humanistic disciples—philosophy especially—had begun to seem less scientific than ever.
This expansion of the authority of the social sciences had political consequences as well.
As scientific rationality promised better solutions to social ills, Gadamer argued, political
communities had delegated more responsibility to technocratic experts, depriving the citizenry of
political initiative by denigrating the value of basic deliberation about the means, ends, and
goods of political and social life. What Gadamer believed he was experiencing was the
philosophical conflict between truth and method playing out in social and political life—with
method gaining the upper hand. The pressing question for Gadamer became what philosophical
hermeneutics could illuminate about this shift—in other words, whether hermeneutics could
offer anything in the way of social scientific insight.
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After the fall of 1974, McMaster declined to renew Gadamer’s contract, forcing him to
relocate south of the border, where he accepted an invitation from Fred Lawrence, a professor of
theology at Boston College, to become a visiting professor of philosophy at B.C. In April of
1974, soon after assuming his new post, Gadamer participated in a symposium at B.C. hosted by
the department of philosophy on the conflict between hermeneutics and critical theory. For his
keynote address at the conference, Gadamer was joined on stage by three familiar faces—
Lawrence, Richard Palmer, and Rudiger Bubner (who, almost a decade earlier in Heidelberg, had
cautioned Palmer against a hermeneutic revision of New Criticism). In his own address, which
he titled “Hermeneutics and Social Science,” Gadamer answered the challenge of critical theory
head-on, citing Taylor’s work as the starting point for a thorough-going hermeneutic revision of
the self-understanding of the social sciences.13 “It is the objection of critical theory that by
hermeneutical effort alone we cannot restore authentic communication in a way that common
sense (in the deeper moral and political meaning of the term) would be able to re-establish the
lost equilibrium of our technological civilization,” said Gadamer. “This theory concludes that
there is only one way to change and to reinstate authentic communication, and that is by
emancipatory reflection: a critical process of self-illumination which is supposed to bring about a
social discourse free from force.”14
In fact, Gadamer agreed with much of the critical theorists’ diagnosis of the state of
twentieth-century democratic societies. Both Gadamer and the critical theorists argued the
ongoing crisis was the result of from a fundamental change in the nature of political life. Modern
Gadamer said, “The social sciences realize that the facts which they thematize are mediated to a large extend by
speech. Hence, the very basis of many investigatory works is ongoing communication. (In this connection, I refer
you to a very convincing article by Charles Taylor in the Review of Hermeneutics describing the inclusion of the
hermeneutical dimension in the foundations of social science.)” See page 311.
14
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technological society had interposed so many degrees of separation between citizens and the
actual structures of political power—byzantine state bureaucracies, convoluted electoral
procedures—that the average citizen’s only direct contact with political power came through
their participation in elections. As a result, the primary project of technocratic politics had
become shaping public opinion, through the mass media, to align with the interests of the most
powerful political and economic powers. “In modern technological society public opinion itself
has in a new and really decisive way become the object of very complicated techniques—and
this, I think, is the main problem facing our civilization,” said Gadamer. “Even the opinions
which form the patterns of social life and constitute the normative conditions for solidarity are
today dominated to a great extent by the technical and economic organizations within our
civilization.” The consequence of these relentless efforts to mold public opinion, Gadamer
argued, was a catastrophic breakdown in political communication: political language no longer
expressed the authentic convictions and desires of citizens, and political discussion no longer
aimed to build consensus among citizens about collective social and political goods. The
alienation of modern political life, Gadamer suggested, was the alienation of having to play by
the rules of a language game that one did not understand and felt powerless to change.
About this diagnosis, at least, Gadamer and critical theorists were in agreement. But
Gadamer thought that the critical theorists had overstated both the severity of the communicative
breakdown and the potential of emancipatory reflection. Emancipatory reflection, Gadamer
charged, promised an impossible position outside the hermeneutic conditions of normal
communication from which to critique those conditions and identify coercive distortion and
discourses of force: “My objection is that the critique of ideology overestimates the competence
of reflection and reason,” Gadamer said. “Inasmuch as it seeks to penetrate the masked interests
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which infect public opinion, it implies its own freedom from any ideology; and that means in
turn that it enthrones its own norms and ideal as self-evident and absolute.”15 For the critical
theorist, citizens could return to the difficult task of reaching agreement over political aims only
after they had used emancipatory reflection to purge political discourse of its coercive elements.
But for Gadamer, such a position outside the hermeneutic conditions of language was an illusion;
the hermeneutic conditions of communication were universal. Any solution to the quite-real
distortions of modern political communication had to be worked out from within them, not from
a privileged vantage point that transcended them: “That is precisely the noble task of
hermeneutics: to make expressly conscious what separates us as well as what brings us together,”
Gadamer said.16 Failing to recognize the universality of the hermeneutic situation doomed the
critical theorists to substituting one ideological system for another.
Instead of emancipatory reflection, Gadamer suggested a return to the classical
Aristotelian concept of praktike episteme as a solution to the crisis of modern political life.
Unlike modern technocratic knowledge, Aristotle’s practical knowledge made no hard
distinction between deliberations about means and deliberations about ends. Practical
knowledge, which included political and moral deliberation, was the type of knowledge where
deliberation about means and ends depended on each other. “In my own eyes, the great merit of
Aristotle was that he anticipated the impasse of our scientific culture by his description of the
structure of practical reason as distinct from theoretical knowledge and technical skill,” Gadamer
said. In this respect, the Aristotelian concept of prudence served as a necessary corrective to the
modern understanding of technocratic intelligence, which was concerned only with determining
and applying the proper means to some pre-determined end. “As relevant as the application of
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science is in many fields of the social life, the properly ‘practical’ function of prudence is a very
different one,” said Gadamer. “It concerns the making of responsible political and practical
decisions about happiness, health, peace, freedom and other stable factors of human-being-asnature.”17
Most importantly, Aristotle’s thematization of practical wisdom presupposed that only
those people who were completely immersed in the social and political life of a community—
i.e., an active citizen—could reason well about its development. “Aristotle’s description and
formulation of the method of practical philosophy acknowledges that morality and politics are
not susceptible to a detached theoretical interest,” Gadamer wrote. “[T]heorizing about practical
and political obligations demands a stabilized moral habituation or orientation which would
prevent us from forgetting the interconnection between generalities and the concrete and binding
situations of practical and political life.”18 From the Aristotelian perspective, the technocratic
expert, studying the conditions of society from a principled intellectual distance, was less wellpositioned to reason intelligently about the proper means and ends of political life than the
average citizen was. Yet so, too, was the allegedly emancipated critical theorist.
For this reason, Gadamer positioned Aristotelian prudence as a more clairvoyant account
of political life than the models offered by scientific rationalists and critical theorists. Political
life, no less than literary interpretation, was a thoroughly hermeneutic task: just as literary
understanding emerges from the slow and deliberate work of hermeneutic reflection, so, too, is
the good of political life only realized through the difficult negotiation of democratic politics.
Any attempt to transcend those conditions—to find an escape from the hermeneutic circle—
invariably created a less self-aware political world, not necessarily a freer or more rational one.
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Gadamer closed his remarks at the conference with a remarkable statement of the rasion
d’etre of philosophy:
“I think, then, that the chief task of philosophy is to justify this way of reason and to
defend practical and political reason against the domination of technology based on
science. This is the point of philosophical hermeneutics. It corrects the peculiar falsehood
of modern consciousness: the idolatry of scientific method and of the anonymous
authority of the sciences and it vindicates again the noblest task of the citizen—decision
making according to one’s own responsibility—instead of conceding that task to the
expert. In this respect, hermeneutic philosophy is the heir of the older tradition of
practical philosophy.19
This affirmation of the practical aim of philosophical hermeneutics marked a genuine shift in
Gadamer’s presentation of the hermeneutical task. When Truth and Method first appeared,
Gadamer insisted that his philosophical project, though grounded in the concrete work of textual
interpretation, was first and foremost concerned with establishing the scientific integrity of
humanistic knowledge, over and against the creeping epistemological claims of the natural
sciences. Any practical import of his inquiry was secondary to this goal. To an extent, Gadamer
continued to resist attempts—like Palmer’s—to adduce from philosophical hermeneutics a new
interpretive praxis for the human sciences. Yet it is clear that by 1974, Gadamer’s attempt to
address hermeneutics to the social sciences had opened up a new and decidedly practical horizon
in his thought. Whether this new horizon entailed any specific partisan commitments exceeds the
scope of the present inquiry, and remains a topic of debate among scholars of Gadamer’s life and
work.20 But more fundamentally than any partisan commitment, this shift in Gadamer’s thought
involved a basic affirmation of democratic political life as a whole, a philosophical vindication
of the quotidian work of citizens: dialogue, deliberation, disagreement. It was precisely these
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practices, in Gadamer’s view, which the fervor for the technological organization of society had
devalued, and which were most in need of rehabilitation.
Yet Gadamer’s fellow participants were not so keen to return to Aristotelian problematics
in search of answers to twentieth-century problems. Although Gadamer acknowledged the
limitations of Aristotle’s usefulness, his interlocutors pushed him further. “I am not convinced
that [Aristotle] is really adequate if one wishes to find a better or less-distorting substitute for lost
orientations,” said Bubner. “The thought of Aristotle does not constitute an original tradition.
Returning to Aristotle is a digging-out of something which belongs to the history of philosophy,
but which is no longer part of our actual tradition.”21 Lawrence leveled a deeper critique,
arguing that Gadamer’s phenomenological account of understanding made it difficult, if not
impossible, to competently navigate the contemporary political world. For Lawrence, the task of
the twentieth-century citizen, living in what he called the era of “post-Hobbesian, postMachiavellian” politics, was not only to understand a plurality of competing definitions of
political goods but, more importantly, to distinguish between authentic political conviction—
convictions that embodied good-faith efforts to advance common political ends—and inauthentic
political convictions—convictions designed to mislead, coerce or confuse. 22 Yet Gadamer’s
phenomenological perspective seemed to offer no basis upon which to disentangle the two;
hermeneutics inevitably collapsed both authentic and inauthentic discourses into the monolithic
authority of tradition. “[Gadamer’s] formulation seems to suggest, against his own deepest
convictions and his own day-to-day performance of philosophy, that it is not of the utmost
philosophical importance to discriminate between the limits of human finitude on the one hand,
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and downright human evil and irrationality on the other,” said Lawrence. “If this is not what
Gadamer means, and I am confident that it is not….then one wonders whether his
phenomenological ontology in the Heideggerian vein…is differentiated enough to thematize in
outline the grounds that are dialectically relevant to the ongoing discrimination between good
and evil on the individual, the social, and the political level.” 23 In other words, modern
citizenship required a more critical perspective than Aristotle was ill-suited to provide.
The debate between critical theory and hermeneutics fizzled in the mid-1970s, as
Habermas began work on what would become A Theory of Communicative Action, published in
1981, and away from his more overtly political writings. Meanwhile, the publication of the first
English translation of Truth and Method in the United States in 1975 opened up new horizons of
inquiry and conversation for Gadamer. In the aftermath, Gadamer reluctantly accepted his
position as the conservative alternative to Habermas and ideology critique. In the afterword to
the English edition of Truth and Method, he wrote:
The weightiest objection against my outline of a philosophical hermeneutics is that I have
allegedly derived the fundamental significance of agreement from the language
dependence of all understanding and all coming to an understanding, and thereby have
legitimated a prejudice in favor of existing social relations. Now, this is in fact right, and
in my view it remains a real insight: namely that coming to an understanding can only
succeed on the basis of an original agreement, and that the task of understanding and
interpretation cannot be described as if hermeneutics has to overcome the opaque
unintelligibility of the transmitted text or even preliminarily the errors of
misunderstanding…My insistence on this point is taken to demonstrate a conservative
tendency and to deter hermeneutic from its proper—critical and emancipatory—task.24
In the main, however, Gadamer simply resisted the tendency to subordinate his philosophical
insight to its quasi-partisan implications. For Gadamer, the impossibility of complete self-clarity
and the universal scope of the hermeneutic condition were phenomenological facts of life;
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whether they were politically popular was largely secondary to their philosophical rigor. In any
event, Gadamer was disinclined to step into the role of the philosopher-moralist. “It may be that
under revolutionary conditions the emergence of the Robespierre, the abstract moralist who
wants to remake the world according to their own reason, will win applause,” Gadamer warned.
“But it is just as certain that their hour is appointed.” 25
Partially for these reasons, Gadamer’s influence on the North American social sciences
was not immediate, but it was ultimately decisive. In the decades after Gadamer’s intervention,
an array of English-language philosophers and social scientists incorporated elements of
Gadamer’s hermeneutics into their studies of the social world––including Taylor, Alasdair
MacIntyre, Richard Bernstein, Robert Bellah, and Hubert Dreyfus.26 Writing in 2002—nearly
three decades after publishing his first essay on Gadamer—Taylor identified Gadamer not only
as one of the most influential social scientific thinkers of the twentieth century but also as one of
the most relevant and important voices for the twenty-first century. In particular, Taylor
identified Gadamer as one of the philosophical forerunners to the multicultural turn in the social
sciences—the effort to offer undistorted and non-ethnocentric accounts of different cultures.
“The great challenge of the coming century, both for politics and for social sciences, is that of
understanding the other,” Taylor wrote. “It is here where Gadamer has made a tremendous

25

Gadamer, Truth and Method, 571.
See Alasdair MacIntyre, “Contexts of Interpretation: Reflections on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method,”
in Boston University Joural 29, no. 1 (1967), 41-46; Alasdair MacIntyre, “On Not Having the Last Word: Thoughts
on Our Debts to Gadamer,” in Gadamer’s Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. Jeff Malpas et. al
(Cambridge: MIT University Press, 2002), 157-172; Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism:
Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Robert Bellah, “The
History of Habit” and “Sociology and Theology,” in The Robert Bellah Reader, ed. Steven M. Tipton (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2006), 203-220 and 451-455; Herbert L. Dreyfus, “Holism and Hermeneutics,” in The
Review of Metaphysics 34, no. 1 (Sept., 1980), 2-23. For a more comprehensive overview of the “interpretive turn”
in the social sciences, see Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan (eds.), Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
26

101

contribution to twentieth-century thought, for he has proposed a new and different model [of
social scientific understanding] which is much more fruitful, and showed promise of carrying us
beyond the dilemma of ethnocentrism and relativism.”27 For Taylor, Gadamer’s description of
understanding as the fusion of horizons offered the most faithful account of the type of
knowledge that emerges from cross-cultural understanding: “Gadamer’s account of the challenge
of the other and the fusion of horizons applies also to our attempts to understand quite alien
societies and epochs,” Taylor wrote. “…Meeting this challenge is becoming ever more urgent in
our increasingly intercommunicating world.”28
This striking evolution in Taylor’s thought suggests not only the staying power of
Gadamer’s hermeneutics but also its continued metacritical relevance. In 1971, Taylor offered an
account of Gadamer’s thought that wrestled with the unprecedented social breakdown and
political crisis of the 1960s and early 1970s. In 2002, Taylor returned to Gadamer’s thought to
make sense of a novel set of social scientific problems associated with the expansion of global
networks of communication and the rise of multicultural societies. The two events of
interpretation, each arising from different interpretive conditions and motivated by different
questions, revealed hitherto-undiscovered potentials in Gadamer’s texts. In the Gadamerian
parlance, the evolution of Taylor’s interpretations manifested the reality of the history of effect.
In an even broader sense, Gadamer’s hermeneutic provides a critical vocabulary to make
sense of the evolution of the social sciences throughout the twentieth century. As the example of
Taylor’s development suggests, the twentieth-century social sciences never escaped the
interpretive flux that, in Gadamer’s exposition, always characterizes hermeneutical
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understanding. Insofar as this remains true today, Gadamer’s contribution to the North American
social sciences runs deeper than the ways that individual social scientists have incorporated his
thought into their research. After Gadamer, interpretation could never be of merely secondary
interest to the social sciences; it had become, in an inescapable way, part of its identity.

3.2 TRANSLATING GADAMER: RORTY AND THE ANALYTIC TRADITION
Gadamer’s final decade in the United States began with a major development in the
history of philosophical hermeneutics: the publication of the first English-language translation of
Truth and Method in 1975 by the British publishing house Sheed & Ward. The translation, from
the second German edition, had been a collaborative effort, overseen by the Irish philosopher
Garrett Barden and British translator John Cumming. In the United States, reviewers greeted the
translation with enthusiasm. “[I]t is impossible to praise this work too highly,” wrote Robert E.
Innis, reviewing the books for The Thomist. “The sensitivity and seriousness of the author, the
breadth and depth of his learning, manifested in the copious and rich notes, the allusive power of
his presentation, and the centrality of his problem make the reading of the book an example of
what it is about…All those laboring in the humaniora…will neglect this volume at their own
risk.”29 In the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Merold Westphal wrote,
“Because of the major importance of [the hermeneutical] tradition and Gadamer’s own impact,
not only in philosophy but also in theology and literary criticism, it is the more unfortunate that
untoward circumstances have delayed its translation until now…It is to be hoped that in this case
[the translators] will have the further reward of seeing an enlarged interest in Gadamer’s work,

Robert E. Inis “Hans-George Gadamer’s Truth and Method: A Review Article,” in The Thomist: A Speculative
Quarterly Review 40, no. 2 (April, 1976), 311-321, here 320-1.
29

103

now that so much of it is available to the English speaking world.” 30 Reviewing the work for
Theological Studies, John T. Ford noted the book’s potentially wide appeal: “A variety of
disciplines should find [Gadamer’s] work a source of interest and insight,” Ford wrote.
[P]hilosophers, e.g., may be most attracted by the critique of German philosophy and its reevaluation of classical Greek and medieval thought; literary critics and historians might profit
from its aesthetic approach to interpretation; moralist presumably could find suggestions for
analyzing the formation of conscience and application of law; systematic theological may well
probe both its methodological implications and specific facets such as the exploration of the
category of ‘experience’ in theologizing about revaluation.” 31
Despite their admiration for Gadamer’s work, reviewers noted a number of flaws in the
new translation. The translators sometimes rendered “Geisteswissenschaften” as “human
sciences” and other times as “modern sciences”; “Wirkungsgeschichte” appeared as “effective
history,” which obscured the fact that it was the work, not the history, that had a primary effect;
“Mitte,” a central concept in Gadamer’s discussion of language, had been translated as “center,”
a European term for a geographical region of a city that lost its resonance with North American
audiences. The text was also riddled with typos and omissions: entire lines of the German texts
were missing; John Stuart Mill became “John Stewart Mill”; Gadamer’s italicizations were either
ignored or shoddily reproduced. As Westphal charitably put it, “Such quibbles are the normal
gratitude publically [sic] showered upon translators and publishers. They have the inner
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satisfaction of having done the impossible, for as Gadamer never tires of reminding us, thought
cannot really be translated from one language to another.” 32
The concentration of interest in Gadamer’s work among American theologians and
philosophers of religion was due in part to Gadamer’s presence at Boston College, a Jesuit
institution with a rich tradition of Catholic theological scholarship. Gadamer’s pattern of
appointments at Catholic universities might have seemed odd in light of his deep philosophical
roots in Protestant scriptural hermeneutics, but Gadamer found himself genuinely at home in the
intellectual climate of both Boston College and Catholic University. With the analytic cast of
mind dominating most secular departments of philosophy, Catholic institutions like B.C.
provided havens for philosophers like Gadamer who were ill at ease in analytic departments.
Writing to Heidegger in 1976, Gadamer explained, “On the whole I see very clearly that it is the
predominantly Catholic (Irish) element in the country that one can appeal to…For this reason,
smart and talented non-Catholics prefer philosophy at Catholic universities to the ‘analytical’
sterility typical in the country.”33
Gadamer also discovered real intellectual affinities between his own work and Catholic
theology, based in their shared grounding in Greek metaphysics. “Of course, I myself certainly
claim no special competence as a theologian. But since Greek metaphysics has had such a
profound influence of Christian dogmatics, especially through the adoption of Aristotle in such
an encompassing way, the tension resident in the Roman Catholic metaphysical conception of
God as the highest being were long familiar to me,” wrote Gadamer later in his life.34 Gadamer
also discovered a sense of compatibility with Protestant departments of theology, whose focus on
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exegetical work in Greek texts aligned closely with his ongoing work on Plato. “[S]ince the
question, ‘How is it possible to speak about God?’ was central to dialectical theology in
Protestantism, their interest was philosophically concentrated above all on the nature of the
divine instead of on Greek religious cults, and much more on Plato than on Aristotle,” Gadamer
wrote.35 His real affinities, however, lay with the Catholics: “Indeed, it is my expectation that the
Catholic tradition in America is closer to my country than the Protestant one,” Gadamer said in
1976.36
Despite his residency at Catholic University, it was in the field of analytic philosophy
that Gadamer’s influence began to exert itself most forcefully following the appearance of the
English translation of Truth and Method. Since the time of Gadamer’s arrival in the United
States in 1968, American philosophers had understood philosophical hermeneutics as part of the
broad phenomenological project of “continental philosophy,” which presented not so much a real
challenge to Anglo-American analytic philosophy as a curious and opaque alternative. An article
in Catholic University’s student newspaper announcing Gadamer’s appointment in 1969 noted
this particular opposition, reading, “Among the topics considered in ‘Warheit und Methode’ are
the ontological status of the world of the art, the logic of the ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ and the
obscurity of the theme of language in these analyses gives [Gadamer’s] work an important role
in the discussion between the so-called ‘continental’ and ‘Anglo-Saxon’ tradition.”37 Gadamer,
too, was aware of the mutual unintelligibility of the two traditions. “The German philosophical
tradition does not seem to fit in well with the predominant philosophical standards of this
continent,” Gadamer wrote in the Boston College student newspaper in 1974. “A very strong
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concentration on logic, analysis of ways of speaking, and on the theory of science makes a
German philosopher and one who is interested in phenomenology and especially Heidegger,
appear in the suspicious role of an unscientific witch doctor caught up in his own unfounded
world view. These philosophers would like to inculcate in him a bit of their own sobriety and
clarity.”38
Philosophical clarity, after all, was what Gadamer had been after all along. Since his
early trips to the United States, Gadamer had attempted to translate hermeneutics into a
philosophical language that would allow for fruitful exchange with analytic philosophers. “As I
learned to speak English a little better, albeit slowly, and got better acquainted with American
philosophers, it became quite apparent to me that there was [sic] also quite viable bridges from
analytic philosophy to hermeneutics,” Gadamer wrote. “As a matter of fact, already very shortly
after I had completed Truth and Method in 1960, I had myself begin to read the later
Wittgenstein and found there much that had long been familiar to me.”39
Yet, as always, the process of translation presented difficulties. In his early encounters
with analytic philosophers, Gadamer realized that he could not merely take on a new
philosophical vocabulary. Initiating real dialogue between hermeneutics and analytic philosophy
would require that Gadamer adopt an entirely new way of being in language. “Language and
words have a completely different place in the tradition of philosophy familiar to us than they do
in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of philosophy,” Gadamer wrote. “Certainly it is true that within
Anglo-Saxon philosophy, too, the heritage of humanistic tradition lives on and is perceivable in
their reigning concepts, but these concepts have no different function than they do in the
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linguistic formulations customary in the empirical sciences.”40 From Gadamer’s vantage-point,
analytic philosophy, like the empirical sciences, understood words and concepts as instruments,
used to designate and name objects and entities. On this view, translation was in theory
unproblematic: all one has to do to move from one language to another was to find suitable
words to designate the same concepts and objects. From Husserl and Heidegger, though,
Gadamer had absorbed an entirely different understanding of language. For the
phenomenologists, language was the medium of being, the existential edifice in which human
beings dwelled. “The ‘use’ of words in language is not a ‘using’ at all. Rather, language is a
medium, an element,” Gadamer wrote of his early reaction to analytic philosophy. “Language is
the element in which we live, as fish live in water.” 41 On this construal of language, translation
required much more than finding suitable substitutes for linguistic signs. A translator had to
linger in the life world of a foreign language, learning its topology and breathing its air before
successfully moving between languages. “Our terms are not like signs that point to something,
but rather themselves tell something of their own origin and from this they form a horizon of
meaning which is supposed to lead speaking and thinking beyond themselves to the thing
meant,” Gadamer wrote. 42 To successfully translate meant to expand one’s horizon of meaning
to encompass the entire matrix of significance and saying power of a foreign language.
For philosophical hermeneutics to gain traction in the Anglo-American context, Gadamer
recognized, he would also have to challenge analytic philosophy’s dominant understanding of
language and linguisticality. A number of Gadamer’s early lectures in the United States,
including his very first address at Vanderbilt University, “The Problem of Language in
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Schleiermacher’s Philosophy,” must be understood as part of this. Yet as these early examples
made clear, Gadamer the English-language lecturer was poorly suited for this task. His tenuous
grasp of the English language notwithstanding, Gadamer lacked the basic fluency in analytic
methods and concepts to affect such a rapprochement. His understanding of instrumental uses of
language came from the Marburg Neo-Kantians, not Frege or Russell, and as a trained classicist,
he had never read deeply in the analytic tradition.
Luckily for Gadamer, a critical re-evaluation of the language and presuppositions of
analytic philosophy was already underway in North America when the translation of Truth and
Method appeared in 1975. In 1967, the American philosopher Richard Rorty, borrowing a term
from Gustav Bergman, had labeled this dramatic surge of interest in the philosophy of language
“the linguistic turn,” calling it “the most recent philosophical revolution” in Anglo-American
thought. In the preface to The Linguistic Turn, his celebrated anthology of language philosophy
published in 1967, Rorty wrote: “By ‘linguistic philosophy,’ [I mean] the view that philosophical
problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, or by
understanding more about the language we presently use.”43 Though offering heterogeneous and
often incompatible solutions, the drivers of the linguistic turn, Rorty argued, were united by their
critique of the prevailing self-identity of Anglo-American philosophy. “The linguistic turn in
philosophy is a reaction against the notion of philosophy as a discipline which attempts to find
the solution of certain traditional problems—problems (apparently) generated by certain
commonsense beliefs,” Rorty wrote. “The critical thrust of the linguistic movement in
contemporary philosophy is against philosophy as a pseudo-science; it has no animus against the
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creation of a new art form within which, consciously rejecting the goal of ‘solving problems,’ we
may carry on in the open an activity previously conducted behind a façade of pseudo-scientific
argumentation.”44
Given the chronology of Gadamer’s reception in North America, it would be pure
anachronism to position him as an initiator of the linguistic turn. That title must be reserved for
two other authors or, more specifically, for two particular texts: Ludwig Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical Investigations, published in English in 1953, and Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, published in 1962.45 Yet while Gadamer was not responsible for
launching the linguistic turn, his influence shaped the trajectory of post-turn Anglo-American
philosophy. In this respect, the publication of the English-language translation of Truth and
Method helped his cause immensely. For the first time, English-language philosophers trying to
forge a path beyond the linguistic turn had access to Gadamer’s systematic treatment of
philosophical hermeneutics, rather than having to rely on his partial and occasionally convoluted
explications of his philosophy in talks and lectures. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics
would become a touchstone of this effort.
And it would be Rorty himself who would become the most influential translator of
Gadamer’s hermeneutics for the audience of analytic philosophers. In terms of his formal
academic training, Rorty was an analytical philosopher par excellence. Educated at the
University of Chicago and Yale—both home to philosophy departments that maintained
somewhat ambivalent attitudes toward logical positivism—he gained a deep fluency in the
Rorty, “Introduction,” 23.
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language and style of analytic philosophy, especially while studying with Rudolf Carnap at
Chicago. 46 At Yale, Rorty studied with the respected analytic philosopher Wilfrid Sellars, and
many of Rorty’s notable early essays, especially “Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories,”
published in 1965, fell squarely within analytic debates.
Yet Rorty was never fully at home in the world of analytic philosophy. At Chicago, he
identified strongly with the anti-positivism of the department’s metaphysicians, especially
Richard McKeon and Charles Hartshorne. 47 As a Ph.D. candidate at Yale, he completed a 600page doctoral thesis on the metaphysics of potentiality––a decidedly anti-positivism subject––
under the speculative metaphysical Paul Weiss. As his professional career progressed, it became
increasingly clear that his real philosophical allegiances lay not with logical positivism but with
the tradition of American pragmatism. In 1961, well before he published “Mind-Body Identity,
Privacy, and Categories,” Rorty published an essay titled “Pragmatism, Categories, and
Language,” in which he offered an extensive exposition of Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatism and
argued for pragmatism’s continued relevance to American philosophy. While teaching at
Princeton University in the 1960s and ’70s, he returned with vigor to the work of the other
fathers of American pragmatism, John Dewey and William James, both of whom he came to
favor over Peirce. His interest in pragmatism led him deeper into the work of other non-analytic
philosophers, most notably Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Foucault, and, in time, Gadamer.
Rorty’s groundbreaking book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, published in 1979,
was the fruit of this study. The book was a work of gleeful analytic iconoclasm, taking as its
targets the most sacred presuppositions of analytic philosophy: that knowledge is equivalent to
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accurate representations in the mind of the external world; that philosophy is the discipline
responsible for determining foolproof methods of mental representation and for adjudicating
claims to representational validity. The iconoclastic tone of the work was intentional:
“‘Philosophy’ became, for intellectuals, a substitute for religion,” he wrote in his introduction.
“It was the area of culture where one touched bottom, where one found the vocabulary and the
convictions which permitted one to explain and justify one’s activity as an intellectual, and thus
to discover the significance of one’s life.” 48
Against an exclusively epistemological philosophy, Rorty positioned the work of “the
three most important philosophers of [the twentieth] century:” Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and
Dewey. In Rorty’s reckoning, all three had in their own way transcended philosophy as a search
for the foundations of knowledge. Yet rather than adopting the strategies of analytic philosophy
to critique it from within, these “revolutionary” philosophers exposed the limitations of analytic
philosophy by formulating comprehensive philosophical systems that completely excluded
conventional concepts like “mind,” “representation,” and “foundation.” “Wittgenstein,
Heidegger, and Dewey have brought us into a period of ‘revolutionary’ philosophy….by
introducing new maps of the terrain (viz., of the whole panorama of human activities) which
simply do not include those features which previously seemed to dominate,” he wrote.49
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature was Rorty’s attempt to create an atlas of this new,
revolutionary world.
Rorty’s own critique of analytic philosophy—which comprised two-thirds of the book—
was formidable. Unlike his philosophical models, he opted to attack analytic philosophy from
within, using its styles of argumentation and analysis to expose the inherent limitations and
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contradictions of its systems. Yet it was his proposal for a new, post-epistemological mode of
philosophy that proved most controversial, and in which Gadamer and philosophical
hermeneutics played a central role. Recognizing that the demise of traditional epistemology
created a philosophical “vacuum which need[ed] to be filled,” he reached for the term
“hermeneutics” to describe the philosophical situation that he hoped to inaugurate. Yet it was not
so simple, he argued, as substituting hermeneutics for epistemology: “I want to make clear at the
outset that I am not putting philosophical hermeneutics forward as a ‘successor subject’ to
epistemology, as an activity which fills the cultural vacancy once filled by epistemologically
centered philosophy,” he wrote. “…On the contrary, hermeneutics is an expression of hope that
the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled—that our culture should
become one in which the demand for constraint and confrontation is no longer felt.” 50
In this sense, Rorty presented hermeneutics not as an alternative philosophical system to
analytic philosophy but as an entirely new mode of discourse—both a way of speaking and a
way of thinking about speaking. Adapting Kuhn’s distinction between “normal” and
“revolutionary” science, Rorty termed hermeneutics an “abnormal discourse,” opposed to the
“normal discourse” of epistemology:
[N]ormal discourse is that which is conducted within an agreed-upon set off conventions
about what counts as a relevant contribution, what counts as answering a question, what
counts as having a good argument for that answer or a good criticism of it. Abnormal
discourse is what happens when someone joins in the discourse who is ignorant of these
conventions of who sets them aside…But hermeneutics is the study of an abnormal
discourse from the view of some normal discourse—an attempt to make sense of what is
going on at a stage where we are still too unsure about it to describe it, and thereby to
begin an epistemological account of it. 51
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Drawing directly from Gadamer, he argued that hermeneutics, at its most basic level,
conceptualized philosophy as conversation over declamation: “Hermeneutics sees the reaction
between various discourses as those of strands in a possible conversation, a conversation which
presupposes no disciplinary matrix which unites the speakers, but where the hope of agreement
is never lost so long as the conversation lasts,” he wrote. “This hope is not a hope for the
discovery of an antecedently exciting common ground, but simply hope for agreement, or, at
least, exciting and fruitful disagreement.”52
From Rorty’s vantage point, Gadamer’s positive contribution to a post-epistemological
philosophy lay in his concept of Bildung, developed in the first chapters of Truth and Method.
“For my present purposes, the importance of Gadamer’s book is that he manages to separate off
one of the three strands—the Romantic notion of man as self-creative—in the philosophical
notion of ‘spirit’ from the other two strands with which it becomes entangled,” he wrote. “…He
does this by substituting the notion of Bildung (education, self-formation), for that of
‘knowledge’ as the goal of thinking.”53 Rorty chose to translate Bildung as “edification” rather
than the more conventional “education” to emphasize its divergence from normal discourses:
“For edifying discourse is supposed to be abnormal, to take us out of our old selves by the power
of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings,” he wrote. Following Gadamer, he positioned
Bildung was the proper work of Gadamer’s historically effected consciences: “Gadamer
develops his notion of wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstein (the sort of consciousness of the past
which changes us) to characterize an attitude interested not so much in what is out there in the
world, or in what happened in history, as in what we can get out of nature and history for our
own uses,” he wrote. “In this attitude, getting the facts right (about atoms and the void, or about
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the history of Europe) is merely propaedeutic to finding a new and more interesting way of
expressing ourselves, and thus coping with the world. From the educational, as opposed to the
epistemological or the technical, point of view, the way things are said is more important than
the possession of truths.”54
As the above passages suggest, Rorty’s effort to reposition Bildung as the central
philosophical task required adopting an entirely new attitude toward knowledge and its
acquisition. “Hermeneutics is not ‘another way of knowing’— ‘understanding’ as opposed to
(predictive) ‘explanation,’” Rorty wrote. “It is better seen as another way of coping…The word
knowledge would not seem worth fighting over were it not for the Kantian tradition that to be a
philosopher is to have a ‘theory of knowledge.’” 55 In a later essay on Gadamer’s influence, he
offered a picture of what a genuinely hermeneutic philosophical practice might look like: “In a
culture that took Gadamer’s slogan to heart, [philosophical] rivalries would not be thought of as
controversies about who is in touch with reality and who is still behind the veil of appearances.
They would be struggles to capture the imagination, to get other people to use one’s
vocabulary.”56 A thoroughly hermeneutic world, according to Rorty, would recast the task of the
historian of philosophy as well as the task of the philosopher: “In this philosophical utopia, the
historian of philosophy will not choose her descriptive vocabulary with an eye to distinguishing
the real and permanent problems of philosophy from the transient pseudo-problems. Rather, she
will choose the vocabulary that enables her to describe as many past figures as possible as taking
part in a single, coherent conversation.”57 In a striking image in Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature, he personified hermeneutic philosophy as an “informed dilettante,” who, in contrast to
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the “cultural overseer” of the Platonic philosopher-king, “[is] charmed out of their self-enclosed
practices,” knowing that “[d]isagreements between disciplines and discourses are compromised
or transcended in the course of the conversation.”58
In an important respect, Rorty succeeded in accomplishing what Gadamer had failed to
do: to translate hermeneutics into a philosophical language that allowed it to enter into
conversation with Anglo-American philosophy. Admittedly, Rorty’s aim was not to synthesize
analytic philosophy and hermeneutics into a new form of inquiry so much as it was to position
hermeneutics as a radical anti-philosophy that wholly transcended the philosophical project of
analytic philosophy. Yet Rorty’s transmutation of hermeneutics into a new mode of discourse as
opposed to a new philosophical system allowed analytic philosophy to coexist with
hermeneutics, and, in limited cases, even absorb some hermeneutic insights. Most notably, Rorty
brought into the American philosophical mainstream Gadamer’s insight that language, beyond a
mere instrument of communication, constituted a world of inquiry, and that some philosophical
questions only appear when philosophers become wanderers in strange and foreign linguistic
worlds. If, as Rorty suggests in The Linguistic Turn, the goal of the new linguistic philosophy
had been to reform or clarify existing uses of language in order to dissolve philosophical
problems, the goal of post-linguistic turn hermeneutics was to invent new uses of language that
allowed philosophers to ask hitherto unrealized questions.
In an interview he gave in 1995, Gadamer shared an anecdote that illustrated (while
perhaps also overstating) the extent of the philosophical intermixing between hermeneutic and
analytic philosophy. In 1981, Gadamer visited Queens College in Ontario, which was them home
to “a purely analytic department” where he delivered a lecture on hermeneutics and engaged in a
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debate with one of his former students, a Kantian teaching in the department. Five years later, in
1986, that same student invited Gadamer back to Queens, but this time Gadamer declined. “I was
no longer keen on traveling because of my age and said: ‘You know, I am familiar with how
things are,” Gadamer recalled. “But he responded: ‘No, you are not, because everyone has now
become a hermeneut.”59
Despite their continuity, Rorty’s adaptation of Gadamer’s hermeneutics involved notable
reinterpretations of Gadamer’s project. As Steve Bouma-Prediger has argued, despite
overlapping in significant ways, Rorty’s and Gadamer’s hermeneutics diverge at critical points. 60
For Gadamer, hermeneutics involved an event of truth and a revelation of being, while for Rorty,
the only sense of “truth” that emerged in hermeneutical discourse was truth as “what-it-is-goodto-believe.”61 While Gadamer was concerned to carve out an area of truth as philosophically
distinct from scientific truth, Rorty aimed to redefine the entire notion of truth altogether,
whether of the scientific or humanistic variety. As a result, Rorty proved much more open to the
implications of radical relativism, whereas Gadamer tried to “negotiate[] his way between the
Scylla of objectivism and the Charybdis of relativism.” 62 Most glaringly, Rorty departed
dramatically from Gadamer’s conception of hermeneutics as dialogical conversation. As BoumaPrediger puts it, “For Gadamer, one converses in order that truth might manifest itself in the to
and fro of question and answer. For Rorty, one converses in order to engage in exciting and
stimulating conversation.”63 His assertion that “hermeneutics views [interlocutors] as united
by…civility rather than by a common goal, much less by a common ground,” could not be less
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Gadamerian.64 For Gadamer, the entire purpose of hermeneutics, its defining telos, was the
working out of common ground through dialogue.
Later in his life, Gadamer resisted some of Rorty’s more radical uses of hermeneutics
while acknowledging their limited legitimacy. In 1999, in a conversation with the Italian
philosopher Riccardo Dottori, Gadamer responded to Rorty’s contention that the good that
philosophy sought after was never more than the useful. While conceding that, in practice,
philosophy must be satisfied with discerning something less than the good in itself, Gadamer
maintained that the search for the good in itself remained a constitutive ideal of philosophical
practice. “I would perhaps agree with [Rorty] that in our search for the good we will, at best, hit
upon the better, never the good in itself. And yet…it’s also true that we will never search for or
find what is better for us without seeking the good in itself or at least having it in mind,”
Gadamer said.65 The same relation held, Gadamer argued, for the search for truth:
[T]he difficulty lies not in our knowing the truth, or the politician not knowing the truth,
or his not needing to know the truth. Here Rorty is correct—anyone who engages in
politics can’t simply desire the true or the good exactly—[and] it’s undoubtedly correct to
say that he orients his own action and conduct with a view to the pragmatic…We see well
that [Rorty] pleads well for this practical or pragmatic reasonableness. If in doing this,
however, he limits himself to just this—without referring it back to the good—he won’t
be able to recognize what the better is in relation to the good, that is, what the better
actually is. One really must recognize that the better is actually only the better in relation
to a final end.66

Despite these areas of agreement, Gadamer chaffed at the unchecked proliferation of
philosophical projects that called themselves “hermeneutics.” Although not singling out Rorty by
name, Gadamer lamented in 1996 the tendency to equate hermeneutics with a total rejection of
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methodological rationality. “Regrettably it is not a superfluous task to go into these questions
[about the origin of philosophical hermeneutics], because many people have seen and so see in
their hermeneutical philosophy a rejection of methodical rationality,” Gadamer wrote. “Many
others, especially after hermeneutics became a stylish slogan, and any and every kind of
‘interpretation’ [that] called itself ‘hermeneutical’ misused the world and the issue because of
which I took hold of this term.”67
The divergences between Gadamer’s conception of hermeneutics and Rorty’s
reinterpretation can be explained in part by the differences in their philosophical interlocutors.
Gadamer formulated his hermeneutics as a response to the traditions of German idealism,
stretching from Kant to Hegel, and of German Romanticism, descended from Schleiermacher.
Against the idealist and Romantic celebration of an infinite self-consciousness, Gadamer sought
to revive the limited, historical consciousness that he found in the work of Plato and Heidegger. 68
Rorty, by contrast, addressed his own reinterpretation of hermeneutics to the whole tradition of
rationalist epistemology, which owed as much as Kant as it did to Descartes and Locke. His
more immediate polemical target was all of logical positivism and analytic philosophy descended
from Russel and Frege who, in Rorty’s view, had uncritically adopted the rationalist concept of
mind. For Rorty, Plato was as much an adversary as he was an ally, and American pragmatism,
much more than Heidegger, supplied him with his philosophical ammunition.
Yet this divergence between Gadamer’s and Rorty’s formulations of hermeneutics is
precisely what the logic of question and answer would predict. Replacing a monologic
conception of philosophy as argumentation with a dialogic conception of philosophy as
conversation requires acknowledging that a philosophical system can only be understood as an
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answer to a given question; when the question changes, so, too, does the answer. Rorty reached
for Gadamer’s hermeneutics to provide an answer to a set of questions that Gadamer himself had
not asked. That he was nevertheless able to discover suitable answers to these questions in
Gadamer’s texts is not evidence of Rorty’s interpretive laxity but proof of Gadamer’s insight that
“we understand differently, if we understand at all.”
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Conclusion
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AFTER GADAMER
On November 12, 1981, a group of scholars gathered at McMaster University, Gadamer’s
temporary academic home, to honor the 81-year-old and his contributions to the university. With
Gadamer in attendance, four scholars delivered addresses: Albert Shalom, Ben F. Meyer, and
Gary Madison, all professors at McMaster, and David Linge, a professor of religious studies at
the University of Tennessee. Following an introduction by Shalom, Meyer spoke on Gadamer’s
contribution to biblical interpretation, Linge surveyed his interventions in contemporary
philosophy, and Madison offered some autobiographical remarks about Gadamer’s influence on
his own development as a scholar.
The conference offered a window onto the deep and manifold ways that Gadamer—both
the philosopher and the man—had influenced its participants. A number of the presenters praised
the ecumenical tendency of Gadamer’s philosophy, citing its ability to bring scholars from
different disciplines together around a set of shared problems. “Quite apart from the customary
seminars held by Visiting Professors, Dr. Gadamer’s presence [at McMaster] acted as something
of a catalyst,” said Shalom in his introductory remarks. “The occasional tendency to torpor, in
this or that department, was frequently transformed into a higher and nobler state of activity.”1
At the University of Tennessee, said Linge, he had been surprised—“though not deeply
surprised”—to come across students at the Graduate School of Planning reading Gadamer’s
essays. “They explained that they work in a field in which both research and decisions of public
agencies that use such research are dominated increasingly by computers,” Linge said. “Gadamer
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helped them to break the mesmerizing power that computer information has come to exercise; in
effect, he helped them to ‘demythologize’ its excessive claims by locating it within the broader
context of human questions, human interpretation, and human decisions.”2
The expansive appeal of Gadamer’s philosophy, though certainly enhanced by
Gadamer’s skill as a master conversationalist, had philosophical roots. Although subsequent
interpreters have taken Gadamer’s work as a kind of apologia for the humanities, the scope of
his philosophical project, as Linge correctly pointed out, was in fact much broader. Unlike
Dilthey, Gadamer had little interest in thematizing understanding in a way that separated
understanding in the Geisteswissenschaften from understanding in the Naturwissenschaften. If
philosophical hermeneutics served to legitimatize humanistic inquiry, Gadamer would have
protested, it was only because they had exposed something about the nature of understanding as
a whole. “Gadamer has shown us that no genuine rehabilitation of the humanities—the
Geisteswissenschaften—is possible that does not illuminate the fundamental conditions that
underlie the phenomenon of understanding in all its modes, scientific and non-scientific alike,
conditions that are therefore ontological rather than merely methodological,” Linge wrote. 3 This
universalist tendency in Gadamer’s thought had found its natural corollary in the broad interest
that his work had aroused. “Gadamer’s influence, like that of all truly seminal thinkers, has thus
refused to be confined to any narrow field of specialization,” Linge said. “It is this connective or
integrative power of his philosophical hermeneutics, I believe, that is his greatest contribution to
our time—a time in which a host of fragmented, disconnected and thus often demonic claims to
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knowledge and authority obscure any clear vision of our presence in the world and threaten the
very survival of our civilization.”4
Gadamer himself might have offered a more modest appraisal of his philosophical
success. In his final years in the United States and throughout the final two decades of life,
Gadamer frequently suggested that both he and his thinking were out of touch with the
contemporary zeitgeist. “I am an old geezer, and I stopped saying anything that made sense
about, oh, ten or fifteen years ago,” said Gadamer in an interview with the B.C. student
newspaper in 1980. “But because I am so distinguished looking, everyone still talks to me as if I
were still the brilliant man I once was.”5 The foreign norms of the American university only
heightened Gadamer’s sense of alienation, though he looked upon its idiosyncrasies with his
characteristic sense of humor. “One is often amazed by the nonchalance with which a student
visits a professor in his office—out of pure curiosity,” Gadamer wrote in The Heights in 1974.
“But then [he] forgives the student because one is glad to note that the student seldom extends
his visit too long and always ends with thanks for ‘having spent some of your time.’” 6 Gadamer
also noted that his American students proved more technically skilled than their German
counterparts, though the quality of their bibliographies made him wonder whether “the student
devotes more of his time to the study of secondary literary research, even the mastery of
bibliography as such, than to his real object, the text.”7
Yet these lighthearted asides obscured Gadamer’s graver suspicion that he had delivered
philosophical hermeneutics to the world too late. Living into his ninth decade, he feared that he
had survived only to see his ideas become historical marginalia, a sort of philosophical atavism
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from a bygone era rather than a live philosophical option. “‘My influence,’ in the world’”
Gadamer wrote in 1993, “is minimal. In all cultural circles I am considered someone who
pointed the way down a particular path. Will anyone take it? Apparently not.” 8 His sense of
philosophical failure commingled with the more personal pains of feeling that he had lived past
his appointed hour. “In the next century I will be treated simply as one of the philosophical
thinkers of the past. So much is clear to me. And for now? I am a living anachronism—because I
do not belong to present any longer but am still here.”9
And yet, as Gadamer’s hermeneutics teaches, an author is never the most authoritative
interpreter of his own works—nor the best judge of his influence. In fact, the period between
1986, when worsening health forced Gadamer to leave the United States for Heidelberg, and his
death in 2002, witnessed the widespread dissemination and adaptation of his ideas, reaching
fields as disparate as medical ethics, feminist theory, and dramaturgy. 10 His death prompted an
outpouring of scholarly work on hermeneutics and was marked by a number of obituaries in
prominent national newspapers, including The New York Times and The Washington Post. In the
Times, Gadamer’s obituary appeared under the headline, “Hans-Georg Gadamer, 102, Who
Questioned Fixed Truths,” a description that would have almost certainly rankled Gadamer had
he been alive to read it.11
As the Times’ headline suggests, Gadamer’s philosophy never entirely escaped the
uneasy position that Palmer had assigned to it as the antagonist of interpretive objectivism. As
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Linge noted in his remarks at MacMaster, Gadamer often assumed the unenviable position of
arguing against deeply engrained ways of making sense of the world. “One of the persistent
difficulties Gadamer has faced, especially in the English-speaking world, is that the central thesis
of his philosophy…swims against the stream of the deeply held, common-sense view of thing,”
Linge said. “But conventional wisdom has the annoying habit of reasserting itself against
Gadamer and, for many readers, this reassertion of the more conventional framework supplied by
the consciousness-oriented ontology of recent centuries has the effect of waking them up from a
kind of temporary spell which Gadamer has cast over them.” 12
The task facing proponents of Gadamer’s hermeneutic today is to make this spell last.
Gadamer’s influence has been broad, but it has hardly been uniform. In contrast to literary
interpretation, theology and the social sciences, the theory-averse historical disciplines, including
intellectual history, have not been quick to take up philosophical hermeneutics as a source of
theoretical insight. Some theoreticians, nevertheless, have tried. In 1982, the influential UC
Berkeley historian Martin Jay published an essay advocating for a hermeneutic turn in
intellectual history, noting the obvious value that Gadamer’s study of textual interpretation might
offer to a discipline whose chief aim is to make sense of complex historical texts. For Jay,
hermeneutics offered a workable middle way between the pitfalls of historical positivism and the
complete dissolution of historical meaning proposed by the more radical post-structuralist
theorists. “Gadamerian hermeneutics, while avoiding what the New Critics…called the
‘intentional fallacy,’ also resists what might be termed the ‘anti-intentional fallacy’ of the
structuralist and post-structuralist,” wrote Jay. “At the same time as it resists the naturalization of
historical consciousness produced by a naively objectivist view of the past, it also avoids
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reducing history to an arbitrarily constructed vision of the present.”13 Jay also suggested that a
genuinely hermeneutic approach to intellectual history would include an investigation of the
reception of a text as well as into the historical conditions of its creation. “The history of a text’s
effect,” Jay wrote, “may well be more a chronicle of successive misunderstandings than perfect
reproduction…but the potential for the specific distortions that do occur can be understood as
latent in the original text.”14 Finally, Jay argued that Gadamer’s hermeneutics, if supplemented
by elements of Habermas’s critical perspective, could gesture toward a new definition of
historical method as a whole, a definition that would balance the recognition of the linguisticallyand historically-mediate nature of understanding with the need for a more critical rationality.
“Just as the alternative between seeing language as either perfectly transparent or totally opaque
is too rigidly posed, so too the opposition between a linguistically informed intellectual history
and one indebted to traditional (or, in Habermas’s case, nontraditional) concepts of rationality is
incessantly extreme,” wrote Jay. “[W]ithout some dialogical play between them, our reading of
the past will remain either anachronistic, in the sense of being indifferent to the liveliest
philosophical currents of our day, or, what is worse, incapable of providing a critical perspective
on the past and present in the name of a more attractive future.” 15
The preceding two chapters have, in a limited way, tried to explore some of the
narratological possibilities that such a hermeneutic approach to the past opens up for intellectual
history. We can now say with greater precision what these are. The first and less novel insight is
that intellectual history must be essentially dialogical in character. As Gadamer argued, the task
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of an interpreter is to understand a philosophical statement, and, by extension, a philosophical
system, as an answer to a question. Any historical account of the genesis of an idea that fails to
account for the question to which that idea is a response proves incomplete. And yet while
intellectual historians of a variety of methodological persuasions have accepted this point, it is
clear that its acceptance entails very little else in the way of methodological mandates. It is just
as compatible, for example, with a staunchly historicist and contextualist approach as it is with a
hermeneutic one, though it raises different problems with each. Gadamer’s particular insight,
however, is that a text can serve as a meaningful answer to more than one question, and that our
understanding of texts will change as we ask different questions of it. For this reason, some
hypothesized original question––the question that an author had in mind, for example, or the
question that a contemporary audience asked––does not hold any sort of epistemological priority
over subsequent questions. Contra strong contextualist approaches, the meaning of a text is
coextensive with the questions that interpreters ask of it.
This suggests Gadamer’s second major historiological insight, which is that the reception
or “effect” of a text constitutes an integral element of its historical meaning. In the late 1970s and
throughout the 1980s, Gadamer’s student Hans-Robert Jauss developed the consequences of this
insight for literary interpretation under the heading of “reception aesthetics,” and his conclusions
hold substantially true for intellectual history as well.16 This particular fusion of reception and
meaning in intellectual history is what I have tried to explore with my concept of the encounter.
On this reading, an encounter marks a moment of disclosure, a point in time when a possible
meaning of a text becomes manifest in dialogue between two (or more) interlocutors. To use
Gadamer’s terminology, an encounter is a fusion of horizons, or, put somewhat differently, the
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moment when a potentiality of meaning becomes an actuality, understood on the model of
Aristotelian phronesis that Gadamer proposed. There is a tendency among the more avowedly
historicists styles of intellectual history to chart the history of successive interpretations of a text
as a gradual falling away or distancing from an original meaning. In Gadamer’s Aristotelian
terms, this style of intellectual history mistakenly construes interpretation as teche rather than as
phronesis. It assumes that the interpreter, like the carpenter, possesses some sort of blueprint that
can serve to distinguish correct from incorrect interpretation. As Charles Taylor has persuasively
argued, abandoning this model does not entail embracing complete interpretive relativism, but it
does require revising what we understand as a successful or faithful interpretation. 17
To be clear, the point of this reflection is not to delineate a new historical methodology in
the conventional sense of the word, i.e. a way of doing history that fixes the past in place as a
stable, unmediated object of inquiry. The basis of Gadamer’s criticism of method was that the
past does not strictly speaking exist in this sense; it is not an “object-in-itself,” any more than is
the meaning of a text. The past is available to us only insofar as it manifests in tradition—which
is to say that it exists always in mediation. The purpose of hermeneutic reflection is not to escape
this mediation but to make its effects conscious and explicit. My contention is that the same
insight can be applied to historical narrative—that it is both possible and useful to construct
narratives that capture, almost mimetically, the movement of historical understanding. Historians
cannot escape history, but they can at least attempt to craft narrative structures that make
explicit, if not wholly transparent, their involvement in it.
This raises a final hermeneutic question: what does it mean to encounter Gadamer today?
An answer to this question must begin with the questions that contemporary readers ask of his
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texts. For my part, I first read Truth and Method as part of a broad survey of historical and
contemporary debates in the philosophy of history. I had turned to these debates to try to answer
a question that continued to arise in my readings of pre-modern historical texts: what is the
philosophical consequence of recognizing that the very concept of history is itself historical, that
what constitutes historical evidence, historical explanation, and even historical truth has changed
over time and will continue to change? Could historians abandon the presupposition that history
as we practice it now will prove to be any more durable than the models it supplanted, and
instead practice history in a way that accounts for the inevitable flux of historical concepts?
I found few answers to these questions in the English-language debates in the philosophy
of history, which include contributions from very talented historians and philosophers alike. In
general, these debates take the form of debates about the epistemology of history: how can we, as
historical beings, know the past and produce truthful representations of the it? In the main, I
found that contributors to these debates have generally adopted one of two approaches: either
they unsuccessfully attempt to delineate a new historical methodology that would secure an
objective, quasi-scientific understanding of the past, or, having concluded for a variety of reasons
that such a methodology is unattainable, they maintain, with an air of resignation, that historians
can still responsibly proceed with historical research despite the absence of a uniform
methodology.18 (Hayden White and Dominic LaCapra are the two major American theorists who
have offered radical and sustained alternatives to the theoretical norm, but the reaction to their
work among intellectual historians has been fraught with ambivalence.19)
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By contrast, Gadamer offers something new. Like Heidegger, he approaches history as a
question of ontology, not of epistemology. Truth and Method is Gadamer’s attempt to explicate
the structure historical being, to explore what it means most fundamentally to be a historical
being. It explores the philosophical possibilities that open up when we cease to view the past
only as a potential object of knowledge and begin to understand it as a sort of existential edifice,
a thing that can be experienced and used as well as known. In short, Gadamer offers to a twentyfirst-century reader the possibility of history after epistemology. Just what this history will look
like is the question that he leaves us with.
In another important respect, Gadamer’s hermeneutics goes a long way to alleviating
some of the anxiety that pervades English-language debates about the supposedly non-scientific
nature of historical knowledge. As Gadamer himself wrote in the preface to Truth and Method,
“the one-sidedness of hermeneutic universalism has the truth of a corrective.” 20 Against
historicism’s preoccupation with method, Gadamer defended the reality of a type of knowledge
that precedes, and thus constrains, the achievements of a methodological consciousness. He
demonstrated that a subject’s involvement in history is a necessary precondition to
understanding, rather than a barrier to it. Most fundamentally, his phenomenological account of
understanding suggested that the quest for some ideal of historical knowledge is always in an
important sense subordinate to the reality of history itself. As Gadamer wrote in the preface to
Truth and Method, “The hermeneutic consciousness seeks to confront [the modern] will with
something of the truth of remembrance: with what is still and ever again real.” If there is a
conservative or reactionary flavor to Gadamer’s hermeneutics, it arises from this impulse to
grasp what is real and, having grasped it, to make peace with it.
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